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TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
KENNETH CULP DAvis*
§1. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
PATCHWORK OF LIAILrrv
Of all deserving tort claims against federal, state and local gov-
ernmental units, probably far more are paid today than are unpaid,
despite the persistence of the basic doctrine that the sovereign can-
not be sued without consent.
This somewhat startling statement is based upon a survey of
the many methods, some rather subtle or concealed, of collecting
on tort claims against governmental units; the statement is not
based upon or susceptible to proof, for no one has collected statistics,
and the limits of "deserving" claims are far from clear. Even so,
sovereign responsibility for tort probably has already become the
rule rather than the exception.
True, the Federal Tort Claims Act' falls considerably short of
compensating all deserving claimants. And the majority of the
states have failed to enact general tort claims statutes that go even
as far as the federal act. Legislation imposing liability upon muni-
cipalities and other local units is less common than legislation im-
posing liability upon states. Furthermore, such legislation as has
been enacted to broaden liability of the various governmental units
has often been construed away by the courts.
How, then, is it possible to say that far more deserving claims
are paid than are unpaid?
The answer is that the payment of tort claims by the various
governmental units is governed only in part by general statutes
exemplified by the Federal Tort Claims Act. In addition to such
general statutes are (1) private laws enacted as a matter of legis-
lative grace, (2) special or limited public legislation,2 (3) indirect
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-78, 2680 (1952).
2. An outstanding example is the legislation providing for payment of
the claims arising out of the Texas City disaster. The Supreme Court denied
government liability in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953). But
Congress, without amending the Federal Tort Claims Act which the Court
was interpreting, provided for payment of the claims. Pub. L. No. 378, 84th
Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 12, 1955).
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liability through such means as insurance, subsuming tort claims
under constitutional provisions requiring compensation for the tak-
ing of property, indemnification of public employees, and (4) liabil-
ity of municipalities under the judge-made doctrine concerning
proprietary functions.
The movement toward sovereign responsibility has of course
been preceded by a shift in philosophical attitudes. Following the
masterful leadership of Professor Edwin M. Borchard, nearly
every commentator who considers the subject vigorously asserts
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity nmst go., The Supreme
Court in 1939 observed that "the present climate of opinion ...
has brought governmental immunity from suit into disfavor."5' ' The
attitude that is now dominant was expressed nearly a century ago
by President Lincoln in his first annual message to Congress: "ft
is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against
itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between
private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims in
their nature belong to the judicial department."
Indeed, as of the 1950's, one may have difficulty understanding
why the doctrine that the king can do no wrong ever found any
acceptance in the American democracy. The men who wrote the
Constitution did not adopt the doctrine. If, as Mr. Justice Frank-
furter has said, "this immunity from suit is embodied in the Coll-
stitution,"7 it has been put there by the judges (except for the
Eleventh Amendment, which is limited to state immunity in federal
courts), for the Supreme Court in 1793 was unable to lind sover-
eign immunity in the Constitution.'
3. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale I. J. I, 129.
229 (1924-25); 36 id. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27) ; 28 Colum. IL. Rev. 577. 73.1(1928).
4. Professor Borchard, in a splendid article of his own. selects anld cite,
thirty-seven books and articles published before 1934. Borchard, .State and
Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A. B. A. - 747,
748 (1934).
For excellent symposia, see 9 Law & Contenip. Prob. 179-370 (1942)
29 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1321-1461 (1954) ; 7 Vand. 1. Rev. 175-270 (1954)
An outstanding recent article is James, Tort Liability of Governmuntal
Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610 (1955).
For an unusually penetrating treatment by an English author colparing
the American, English, and French law, see Street, Governmental Liability
(1953).
5. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 391,
(1939).
6. 7 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 3245, 3252
(1896), quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in dissent in Keniecott Copper
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U. S. 573, 580 (1946).
7. Ibid.
8. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U. S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Not only i, the
holding of special significance, but especially intere,,ting is the remark of
I ol. ,10.751
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Of course, the doctrine stems from the personal position of the
English king. A judgment of the king's court in 1234 proclaimed:
"Our lord the king can not be summoned or receive a command
from any one." Blackstone was on firm ground when he wrote
in 1765 the much-quoted words: "The king can do no wrong . . .
The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even
of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing: in
him is no folly or weakness."''
Chief Justice Marshall gave no reasons in 1821 when he made
his authoritative pronouncement: "The universally received opinion
is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United
States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.",, By
1850 the Supreme Court was saying: "No maxim is thought to be
better established or more universally assented to, than that which
ordains that a sovereign, or a government representing the sover-
eign, cannot ex delicto be amenable to its own creatures or agents
employed under its own authority for the fulfilment merely of its
own legitimate ends. 1"1
In 1882 the Supreme Court came forth with the astonishing
acknowledgment that "while the exemption of the United States
and of the several states from being subjected as defendants to
ordinary actions in the courts has since that time been repeatedly
asserted here, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons
for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doc-
trine."13
In modern times, perhaps the chief philosophical proponent of
the sovereign immunity doctrine has been Mr. Justice Holmes, who
in 1907 declared for a unanimous Supreme Court: "A sovereign
is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obso-
lete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends."' 4 Today hardly anyone agrees that the
Chief Justice Jay: "I wish the state of society was so far improved, and the
science of government advanced to such a degree of perfection, as that the
whole nation could, in the peaceable course of law, be compelled to do jus-
tice, and be sued by individual citizens. Whether that is, or is not, now the
case, ought to be thus collaterally and incidentally decided: I leave it a ques-
tion." Id. at 477.
9. Quoted by 1 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 516 (2d
ed. 1923).
10. Blackstone, Commentaries (10th ed. 1887).
11. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
12. Hill v. United States, 50 U. S. 386, 389 (1850).
13. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 207 (1882).
14. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1907).
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stated ground for exempting the sovereign from suit is either logical
or practical.
Mr. Justice Holmes in a 1926 letter to Laski elaborated on his
view:
"Do you know I really am bothered by the old difference
between us, if there is one, as to sovereignty, because as I under-
stand the question it seems to me one that does not admit of
argument .... If you should say that the Courts ought in these
days to assume a consent of the U. S. to be sued, or to be liable
in tort on the same principle as those governing private persons.
I should have my reason for thinking you wrong, but should not
care, as that would be an intelligible point of difference. But
what I can't understand is the suggestion that the United States
is bound by law even though it does not assent. What I mean by
law in this connection is that which is or should be enforced by
the Courts and I can't understand how anyone should think that
an instrumentality established by the United States to carry
out its will, and that it can depose upon a failure to do so, should
undertake to enforce something that ex hypothesi is against its
will. It seems to me like shaking one's fist at the sky, when the
sky furnishes the energy that enables one to raise the fist. There
is a tendency to think of judges as if they were independ-
dent mouthpieces of the infinite, and not simply directors of a
force that comes from the source that has given them their
authority." 15
Today, of course, all will agree that judges cannot move con-
trary to the expressed legislative will in imposing liability on the
government. But even though judges are not "independent mouth-
pieces of the infinite," they are, within the constitutional and statu-
tory framework, independent architects of justice. They can and
they should resolve doubtful questions in favor of sovereign re-
sponsibility, as the Supreme Court did in 1939 when it unanimously
and avowedly contributed to what it recognized as "a steadily grow-
ing policy of governmental liability" and as "expanding conceptions
of public morality regarding governmental responsibility."10
We now know that neither legislative bodies nor framers of the
Federal Constitution were responsible for the origin and develop-
ment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and we now know
that the judges who created and molded the doctrine were often
actuated by misunderstanding. Perhaps the outstanding simple ex-
ample of a mistake was the unanimous pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in 1868: "No government has ever held itself
liable to individuals for the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized
15. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters 822 (1953).




exercise of power .by its officers and agents."'-7 Professor Borchard
has pointed out that the Court "overlooked the fact that practically
every country of western Europe has long admitted such liability."s
Closer to the heart of the probable motivating reasons for the
development of sovereign immunity is the misunderstanding ex-
emplified by another Supreme Court statement in 1868: "It is
obvious that the public service would be hindered, and the public
safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to
suit at the instance of every citizen, and consequently controlled in
the use and disposition of the means required for the proper ad-
ministration of the government."'19
Not only is this proposition not obvious, but the opposite of the
proposition is rapidly becoming obvious. We know from experience
that the Federal Tort Claims Act-0 has not hindered the public
service and has not endangered the public safety. True, the Act
preserves a good deal of sovereign immunity through its many ex-
ceptions. But the British Crown Proceedings Act of 194721 has
fewer exceptions and it has not hindered the public service or en-
dangered the public safety. Furthermore, New York has gone all
the way in renouncing sovereign immunity from suit and from
liability,22 and the New York experience proves overwhelmingly
that substituting sovereign responsibility for sovereign irresponsi-
bility can be wholly beneficial and in no respect harmful.
2 3
What is most needed now, aside from a general following of
New York's leadership, is a focus upon the extremely difficult
problems of what the limits of liability should be.24
§ 2. PRIVATE LAWS AND LEGISLATiVE GRACE
Private laws, both in the federal government and in most of the
states, are extremely important in the whole picture of payment of
tort claims.
A statement that the federal government is today responsible for
substantially all its torts is reasonably accurate. The chief infirmity
of such a statement does not pertain to governmental failure to pay
the kind of claims that a private corporation or individual could be
forced to pay through legal process; the chief infirmity has to do
17. Gibbons v. United States, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1868).
18. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 2 (1934).
19. The Siren, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868).
20. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-78, 2680 (1952).
21. 10 & 11Geo. VI, c. 44.
22. N.Y. Ct CL Act.
23. New York cases are discussed below, especially in §§ 14 and 15.
24. See especially § 17 below.
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with problems with respect to what is a "tort" in the context of
governmental action of the kind that has no counterpart in the
activities of private corporations or individuals.
2 5
Of course, the Federal Tort Claims Act has big holes in it. It
falls far short of making the government responsible for all its
torts . 2 It has many exceptions, including a list of deliberate torts,
and including especially negligence in the performance of a "dis-
cretionary function."
But the extent to which the government pays tort claims against
it cannot be determined by examination of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.2 7 For one thing, other legislation also provides for government
liability. Even more importantly, tort claims which are not covered
either by the Tort Claims Act or by other legislation are usually
taken care of as a matter of grace through the enactment of private
laws. It is quite common for a private law in providing for payment
of a tort claim to recite that the claim "is not a claim which is
cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. '28
Dalehite Iv. United States,2 the most celebrated case under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, is an excellent illustration of the realities.
Claims against the government totaling about two hundred million
dollars grew out of the Texas City disaster, in which a ship loaded
with fertilizer exploded and caused many deaths and much destruc-
tion. The Supreme Court in the Dalehite case held that the govern-
ment was not liable, because the negligence found by the district
court occurred in the performance of a "discretionary function" and
was therefore within an exception to the Act. But the crucial fact
is that the claimants who lost the Dalehite case in the Supreme
Court later won in Congress. The statute enacted by Congress de-
clares: "The Congress recognizes and assumes the compassionate
responsibility of the United States for the losses sustained by reason
of the explosions and fires at Texas City.. .,3 Especially interest-
ing is the ease with which the congressional committees rejected the
view taken by the Supreme Court. For instance, the House Com-
mittee reported that "the ammonium nitrate fertilizer, an inherently
dangerous and hazardous explosive, was introduced into the flow
of commerce by the United States Government without proper safe-
25. This problem is fully discussed below.
26. See the discussion of the Act below in §§ 8, 9 and 10.
27. See §§ 3, 4, 5 and 7 below.
28. E.g., Priv. L. No. 908, 68 Stat. A247 (1954) ; Priv. L. No. 911. 68
Stat. A248 (1954) ; Priv. L. No. 960, 68 Stat. A276 (1954).
29. 346 U. S. 15 (1953). See the full discussion of the case below in § 9.
30. Pub. L. No. 378, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 12, 1955).
[Vol. 40:751
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guards and warnings. That fact alone, in the opinion of the commit-
tee, is sufficient to place responsibility on the Government..."3z
In the Tort Claims Act as interpreted, Congress did not provide
for such responsibility. In the Texas City legislation, Congress did
provide for such responsibility. Even though Congress provided
for the payment of the Texas City claims, it did not amend the Tort
Claims Act so that in the future similar claims will be taken care of
through the machinery of that Act. For better or for worse- and
most observers may say it is for worse -Congress continues to
choose to pay through congressional action and not through more
facile machinery pursuant to general legislation.3 2
Even so, however cumbersome the machinery, the government
is assuming responsibility for its torts, whether or not the torts are
covered by the Tort Claims Act. Indeed, the government is assum-
ing responsibility for something more than its torts, for the private
laws that are enacted often go beyond the liability that would be
imposed if the government were treated like a private corporation
"or an individual-. Through private laws the government is often
assuming- liability irrespective of fault. As the provocative studies
by Messrs. Gellhorn and Lauer have shown," the committees and
staffs that handle private bills tend to develop principles, and the
tendency toward liability without fault is very pronounced in many
cases, although it is too much to say that the government has fully
adopted a principle of absolute liability. "A recurring test of gov-
ernmental accountability, as one deduces it from the actions of the
" 31. iLR. Rep. No. 2024, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954). See also the
similar statement in S. Rep. No. 684, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1955).
32. "Congress, prior to the passage of the Tort Claims Act, repeatedly
entertained claims and concerned itself with legislation which provided relief
for parties in situations analogous to that submitted to the committee for
investigation. In addition, since the passage of the Tort Claims Act, Congress
has invariably exercised its jurisdiction to legislate when it was satisfactorily
established that for compassionate reasons or in equity and in good conscience
remedial legislation was necessary to fill a void created by existing law." Id.
at 8.
33. Gellhorn and Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Clains
against the United States, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1955) ; Gellhorn and Lauer,
Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
1325 (1954).
The first of these articles is devoted principally to the procedure for the
handling of private laws, including administrative advice before committee
action is taken and presidential approval or veto. The second includes a dis-
cussion of decisional principles in private laws, and also the direct adminis-
trative handling of damage claims.
Gellhom and Laner quote Senator Wiley as chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee: "[M]any of these private bills establish a pattern of
public policy-a kind of legislative common law if that were possible-which
ultimately may emerge as public law." Hearing Before the Senate Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departmnents-Evalhation of Legislath'e
Reorganization Act of 1946, 80th Cong., °2d Sess., 253 (1948).
1956]
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Judiciary Committees, is not whether a federal employee caused
loss while acting within the range of his assigned responsibilities,
but is, rather, whether the United States controlled or was con-
nected with the physical instrumentality through which damage
was done.
3 4
Some of the claims recently paid through private laws were for
such acts as these: a deputy sheriff was run over by an Army truck
driven by a soldier attempting to escape from the custody of the
deputy sheriff ;35 the claimant was struck by an Army vehicle oper-
ated by an enlisted man who, according to a finding of the Depart-
ment of the Army, "was not acting within the scope of his employ-
ment at the time of the accident ;,,3" the claimant was shot by an
insane member of the Army.3 7
The private laws for payment of tort claims almost always con-
tain either a provision that "no part of the amount appropriated in
this Act shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or
attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this
claim" or a provision that not more than ten per cent shall be paid
to any agent or attorney. In a recent discussion of these provisions
on the floor of the Senate, some rather instructive observations were
made:
"Some of us on the Committee on the Judiciary are beginning
to suspect that attorneys are finding out that they can get bills
calling for the payment of money passed by Congress with some
ease... When Congress, more in a spirit of charity than any-
thing else, or for any other reason, appropriates money for the
payment of claims because equities are involved, there is no
reason why attorneys should share in the payments which the
Government makes to the claimants, particularly when all the
work in connection with the claims is done by the staff of the
Committee on the Judiciary .... If a lawyer can come before the
Committee on the Judiciary and show that he had out-of-pocket
expenses or the investment of some time, energy, and legal skill
in connection with the case, there would be no reason at all for
the Committee on the Judiciary to disallow a fair fee... The
committee is now trying to scrutinize each claim bill and de-
34. Gellborn and Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property
Damage, 29 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1325, 1334 (1954). The authors give various
examples, one of which is: "This expanded concept of governmental respon-
sibility is exemplified by the case of several employees of the Alaska Railroad.
Their work tools were lost in a fire that destroyed the federally owned and
operated building in which they had been stored. The blaze that caused the
loss was not attributable to any employee's negligance, nor had there been
any lack of diligence. The Government was held responsible because the
conflagration of its property was the source of the loss." Ibid.
35. Priv. L. No. 900, 68 Stat. A244 (1954).
36. Priv. L. No. 910, 68 Stat..A248 (1954).
37. Priv. L. No. 951, 68 Stat. A265 (1954).
[ Vol. 40:751
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
termine whether there is some justification for allowing a legal
fee in each case... We are in the course of working with the
staff on a series of firm rules establishing formulas to govern the
whole subject, both as to claims and as to the fees."38
Whether by virtue of pressures from lawyers or others who
earn their fees, or whether by virtue of compassion, Congress is
often exceedingly generous in passing private laws for payment of
claims; the degree of generosity can often be seen in the various
messages giving reasons for presidential vetoes.3
In most of the states, the legislatures have power and are will-
ing to exercise the power to enact private laws in some form to take
care of tort claims. In some states, the legislatures consider the
claims directly. 0 In some, the claims are presented to administrative
authorities for recommendations or determinations before they are
presented to the legislatures.-" In others, the legislatures authorize
suits in courts on particular claims or authorize administrative de-
termination of the claims. 42 In at least a dozen states, the constitu-
tions prohibit special acts.43 Most interesting is Kansas, where
despite a constitutional provision that "in all cases where a general
law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted," the
legislature in 1955 enacted at least five bills, containing two hundred
items, making appropriations to named parties, including, for in-
stance, $3,124.43 for "flood damage to home occasioned by im-
proper highway construction," and $15,000 to a widow in com-
pensation for death of her husband, who was killed while on duty as
a guard at the state penitentiary during an attempted escape of
prisoners.
Apparently no information is readily available as to how far
state legislatures have moved toward absolute state liability through
special acts.44
38. 100 Cong. Rec. 8220-21 (1954).
39. E.g., E. S. Berney, S. 46, 100 Cong. Rec. 15841 (1954).
40. E.g., Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, New Hampshire, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, Washington, and others.
41. E.g., Connecticut, Iowa, Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Da-
kota, Utah, West Virginia, and perhaps others.
42. E.g., Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Tennessee, and perhaps
others.
43. Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
- Pennsylvania, Texas, and others. In Nebraska and New Mexico, tie con-
stitutions prohibit legislative permissions to sue on particular claims, and in
Oklahoma some special acts are permissible.
44. For in especially helpful collection of the law of all forty-eight
states, see Leflar and Kantrowitz, 29 Tort Liability of the States, N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 1363 (1954), from which a portion of the information presented here
has been taken. Another such comprehensive study of all the states is Minne-




§3. PIECEMEAL GENERAL LEGISLATION CREATING TORT LIABILITY
Much legislation, both federal and state, provides for payment of
claims within limited areas. Indeed, except for the Federal Tort
Claims Act and legislation in New York and a few other states," all
the legislative inroads upon sovereign immunity from tort liability
have been of a piecemeal character. Even so, the accumulation of
piecemeal legislation, along with private laws and indirect means of
creating liability, has gone so far that probably far more deserving
tort claims are paid than are unpaid.
Other statutes in addition to the Federal Tort Claims Act confer
administrative power to pay claims. Since 1922 the Small Tort
Claims Act4" has permitted administrative payments for property
damage, but not for personal injury, up to $1,000. Without linita-
tion of amount, a 1928 statute provides for filing in the General
Accounting Office of claims against the United States and provides
that the Comptroller General shall submit a special report to Con-
gress making a recommendation whenever in his judgment the claim
"contains such elements of legal liability or equity as to be deserving
of the consideration of the Congress."4 7
The Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are
authorized to pay claims up to $2,500 for losses of property of civil-
ian and military personnel ;48 to pay up to $1,000 for property dam-
age, personal injury or death caused by military personnel or civilian
employees "while acting within the scope of their employment, or
otherwise incident to noncombat activities . . . 1;4 and to pay up to
$5,000, upon a determination by a Claims Commission, for property.
personal injuries, or death of inhabitants of a foreign country caused
by military personnel and civilian employees, "or otherwise incident
to noncombat activities of such forces."50 The Secretary of State
may settle claims up to $1,500 for personal injury or death of any
person, not an American national, in any foreign country, resulting
from acts or omissions of any officer, employee, or agent of the Gov-
ernment of the United States 1 The Attorney General and the Post-
master General since 1921 have had power to settle claims up to
45. See the discussion below in this section.
46. 42 Stat. 1066 (1922), 31 U. S. C. §§ 215-17 (1952).
47. 45 Stat. 413 (1928), 31 U. S. C. § 236 (1952).
48. 59 Stat. 225 (1954), 31 U. S. C. § 222c (1952). A similar statute
concerning loss of property by employees of correctional and penal institu-
tions is 63 Stat. 167 (1949), 31 U. S. C. § 238 (1952).
49. 57 Stat. 372 (1943), 31 U. S. C. § 223b (1952) (Army) ; 59 Stat.
662 (1945), 31 U. S. C. § 223b (1952) (Navy).
50. 49 Stat. 1138 (1936), 31 U. S. C. § 224a (1952). Perhaps by reason
of misprint, both the official and the unofficial copies of the statute apply to
"any act of omission ... "
51. 49 Stat. 1138 (1936), 31 U. S. C. § 224a (1952).
[Vol. 40:751
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$500 for damages to person or property caused by agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and by officers or employees of the Post
Office Department, acting within the scope of employment."
- Various statutes create government liability for action which is
not necessarily classifiable as tortious. An interesting example is a
statute providing for liability to one who has been wrongfully con-
victed of crime and has served all or any part of his sentence.1
In 1855 Congress established the Court of Claims, allowing suits
against the United States on claims founded upon laws of Congress,
regulations of executive departments, or "upon any contract, ex-
press or implied." 54 In 1863 the Court of Claims was authorized to
render judgment against the United States.? By the Tucker Act of
1887 the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was enlarged to embrace
claims for "damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sound-
ing in tort," and concurrent jurisdiction was conferred upon district
courts for claims of not more than $10,000. r6 In 1910 suits against
the United States for infringement of patents were allowed. 7 In
1916 Congress provided workmen's compensation for federal em-
ployeess During the First World Was the government was liable
for torts in operating the railroads 9 In 1920 Congress authorized
suits against the United States for maritime torts, and extended this
liability, in.1925 to damage caused by any public vessel of the United
States.6
Most of the exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act do not
apply to these various statutes, and some of these statutes provide
for liability without regard to the usual limitations concerning scope
of employment. The various statutes should be examined for the
detailed provisions on such questions. Messrs. Gellhorn and Lauer
have written an account of the administration of some of these
statutes.6i
Before the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
Supreme Court asserted, with perhaps a bit of exaggeration, that
"Congress has embarked upon a generous policy of consent for suits
52. 49 Stat. 1184 (1936), 31 U. S. C. § 224b (1952) ; 42 Stat. 63 (1921),
31 U. S. C. 224c'(1952).
53. 28 U. S. C. § 2513 (1952). The liability is limited to $5,000.
54. 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
55. 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1952).
56. 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (1952).
57. 28 U. S. C. § 1498 (1952).
58. 39 Stat 742 (1916), 5 U. S. C. § 751 (1952).
59. 40 Stat. 456 (1918).
60. 41 Stat. 525 (192-0), 46 U. S. C. § 742 (1952) ; 43 Stat. 1112 (1925),
46 U. S. C. § 781 (1952).
61. Federal Liability for Personal and Properly Damage, 29 N. Y. U.
L. Rev. 1325, 1342-62 (1954).
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against the government sounding in tort even where there is no
element of contract.16 2 The Court cited statutes providing for suits
for patent infringement, compensation for disability or death of
government employees, and damage to property by the Army Air
Service. These liabilities may still exist, irrespective of exceptions
to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Although New York is the only state that is liable for all or
nearly all state torts, a dozen other states have undertaken respon-
sibility in most cases.6 3 Perhaps more important than the frequent
liability of these thirteen states is the fact that only eight states
undertake liability in no cases or in almost no cases. 4 This means
that forty states do undertake liability in a significant portion of the
cases. Most states have statutes authorizing suits against the state
or its subdivisions by all persons having claims against them, al-
though seventeen such enactments have been interpreted as merely
permitting the filing of suits or claims, but as having no effect upon
substantive liability.G5
Perhaps more than half the states have enacted general statutes
creating liability for negligence in the operation of state motor
vehicles. A rather surprising type of legislation enacted by about
half the states provides for municipal liability for mob damage,
sometimes irrespective of fault on the part of the municipality ;"0
the purpose of such legislation is said to be "to impose a penalty
upon the community in the form of additional taxes when its meni-
bers participate" in mob action.0 7 Many other types of piecemeal
statutes have been enacted in various states.08
62. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381.
396 (1939).
63. The information in this paragraph is taken entirely from Leflar and
Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1363 (1954).
The dozen states are Alabama, Arkansas (the state, but not local units),
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma (inter-
pretation of statute doubtful), Rhode Island (legislative discretion), Tn-
nessee, and West Virginia. Michigan in 1943 completely waived its immunity
but repealed the waiver in 1945. Id. at 1407.
64. Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Texas
and Wyoming. Ibid.
65. Id. at 1408.
66. An example is Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 38, § 515 (Smith-Hurd 1935)
"Any person so suffering material damage to property or injury to person by
a mob shall have an action against the county, park district or city in which
such injury is inflicted, for such damages as he may sustain, to an amount
not exceeding ten thousand ... dollars."
67. Slaton v. City of Chicago, 8 Ill. App. 2d 47, 130 N. E. 2d 205, 211(1955). The opinion contains an account of the subject of municipal liability
for mob damage, beginning with an English statute in 1714. See Note,
Communal Liability for Mob Violence, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1936).
68. See generally the analysis of statutes by Leflar and Kantrowitz,
supra note 63. Another such study of state legislation is Minnesota Legislative
Research Committee, Payment of Claims against the State (1952).
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In addition to legislation directly imposing liability on the part
of states and their subdivisions, legislation which indirectly creates
liability in tort is becoming very common. To such legislation we
now turn.
§4. INDIRECT METHODS OF CREATING GOVERNMENTAL
TORT LInILITY
Some of the indirect methods by which tort liability of govern-
mental units is created are subtle or concealed and are therefore
easy for the practitioner to overlook.
Much the-most important of these methods is the use of liability
insurance. Legislators who are wary of making state or local units
liable for torts are increasingly willing to provide for payment of
premiums for liability insurance-either insurance protecting the
units and waiving immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage,
or insurance protecting the officers or employees, who are theore-
tically liable but are seldom sued. The typical statute and policy
provide that the insurer may not set up sovereign immunity as a
defense, for in absence of such a provision some courts have held
that the insurer is not liable unless the governmental unit would
be.G9 Because of cases holding that a governmental unit has no au-
thority to insure a risk for which it is not legally liable, special
statutes are usually required. At least two cases have held that
69. In Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N. C. 42, 59 S. E. 2d 195
(1950), the court held that the city could not uwaive its immunity, and that
the insurance covered only indemnity against loss, although the plaintiff
argued that "the company... intended to really insure and not have the
defendant, City of Raleigh, pay a premium out of public funds for nothing."
In Cushman v. Grafton County, 97 N. H. 32, 79 A. 2d 630 (1951), the
county was the insured under a policy obligating the insurer to pay "all sums
which the Insured shall become obligated to pay." The court held that the tort
was committed in exercise of a governmental function, that the county was
not liable, and therefore that the insurance did not cover the tort. The court
distinguished Arnold v. Walton, 205 Ga. 606, 54 S. E. 2d 424 (1949), where
the insurer was held liable under a policy in which the insurer agreed not to
plead sovereign immunity as a defense:
70. In Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N. V. 2d 736(1947), the city took out a policy of liability insurance which provided that the
insurer would not assert sovereign immunity as a defense. The court refused
to give effect to this provision of the policy, because: "No statute is pointed
out as conferring the power to make the agreement referred to... ." Then
the court reasoned: "The Company is not liable unless the City is. The City
not being liable the Company is not." Id. at 27, 27 N. V. 2d at 739.
In Kensman v. School District, 345 Pa. 457, 29 A. 2d 17 (1942), tlhe
school district was insured against liability to passengers in the school bus.
The court held that the school district wA-as not liable and that the insurance
did not have the effect of waiving the immunity.
Since the immunity does not attach to employees of the governmental
units, one might expect that liability insurance protecting the employees would
win judicial approval. But see Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Wain-
scott, 41 Ariz. 439, 449, 19 P. 2d 328, 331 (1933) : "We think it is going too
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presence of liability insurance may diminish the immunity that
otherwise would be recognized. 71
During 1954 Leflar and Kantrowitz wrote: "By far the most
significant development in the state tort field in recent years is the
use of liability insurance both as a substitute for and a supplement
to governmental liability. '7 2 In 1955 legislative sessions alone,
statutes were enacted or strengthened which authorized or required
state agencies or subdivisions to insure against tort liability in Cali-
fornia, Georgia, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon. 78
Another indirect method of imposing liability on governmental
units is through indemnifying officers and employees. Under the
private law principles of agency and tort, an agent is personally
liable for his own torts, whether or not they are within the scope
of his employment." The Supreme Court has declared: "The liabil-
ity of an agent for his own negligence has long been embedded in the
law ... [T]he principle is an ancient one and applies even to cer-
tain acts of public officers or public instrumentalities."'5 The reasons
far to say that the county is authorized to insure any of its employees against
liability to others for their own wrongful conduct."
See Note, The Effect of Insurance on the Tort Immunity of a Govern-
mental Subdivision, 34 Neb. L. Rev. 78 (1954).
71. Bailey v. City of Knoxville, 113 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1953)
Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109
N. E. 2d 636 (1952).
In the Thomas case, supra, the court analyzed reasons for the immunity,
emphasizing protection of public funds and avoiding the diversion of moneys
devoted to governmental purposes to the payment of tort judgments. Then
the court concluded: "Liability insurance, to the extent that it protects the
public funds, removes the reason for, and thus the immunity to, suit." 348 Ill.
App. at 575, 109 N. E. 2d at 640-41.
The court in the Bailey case, supra, reasoned: "Sovereign immnlity
means only that the sovereign may not be sued without its consent. Implied
in that immunity is the power to consent. In this State, the carrying of
liability insurance is construed as a limited consent, or waiver of the im-
munity." 113 F. Supp. at 6. The opinion rests upon Tennessee cases cited by
the court.
72. Leflar and Kantrowitz, supra note 63, at 1413.
73. Cal. Acts 1955, c. 105; Ga. Laws 1955, No. 237; Mont. Laws 1955,
c. 74; N. J. Laws 1955, c. 152; N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 911; N. D. Sess.
Laws 1955, c. 261; Okla. Sess. Laws 1955, §§ 30.16-.20; Ore. Laws 1955, c. 288.
74. Restatement, Agency § 343 (1933). Of course, if a principal is held
liable for a tort of an agent, the principal is theoretically entitled to indemnity
from the agent. Id. § 401. But the theory is seldom if ever carried into prac-
tice, for corporate policies generally oppose looking to employees for liability.
After the United States has been liable in tort under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, it may not recover from the employee who committed the tort.
United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 (1954).
The Federal Tort Claims Act makes a judgment against the United
States a complete bar to any action by the plaintiff against the employee.
28 U. S. C. § 2676 (1952).
.75. Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 580 (1943). The state-
ment is not always reliable, for many public officers are not liable for their
torts. See Davis, Administrative Law § 231 (1951).
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for holding agents liable are in many circumstances very much
strengthened if the governmental principal indemnifies its agent for
any such liability the agent may incur.
Federal law in general has not exploited this rather attractive
idea of indemnifying officers and employees against loss. 0 The
Supreme Court made a start in that direction in 1836 when it held
a collector of customs liable for damages to goods detained under
instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury: "It would be a
most dangerous principle to establish, that the acts of a ministerial
officer, when done in good faith, however injurious to private rights,
and unsupported by law, should afford no ground for legal redress
... Some personal inconveniences may be experienced by an officer
who shall be held responsible in damages for illegal acts done under
instructions of a superior; but, as the government in such cases is
bound to indemnify the officer, there can be no eventual hardship."---
The Supreme Court in 1871 abandoned the technique of the 1836
case, by holding that an officer who has "jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter upon which judgment is passed" is not liable even for a
ministerial act "although serious errors may have been com-
mitted."78 Although the technique is not followed by the federal
courts in tort cases, it is still followed in suits against tax collectors
for tax inoney wrongly collected; the Supreme Court in modem
.times has explained the system of indemnification of tax collectors-
a system based upon a statute providing for indemnification.-0 Even
a collector, however, is not liable in tort for illegal seizure and sale
of property under an invalid warrant for distraint.80
Indemnification of officers and employees is nevertheless import-
ant in some states. A good example is a Wisconsin statute which
sets up a commission to provide "relief of law enforcement officers
employed by the state who have judgments against them for dam-
ages caused while in their line of duty where they acted in good
faith and who have incurred charges for counsel fees and costs in
defending said action.'" An example at the municipal level is an
76. For torts involving ordinary negligence, the ultimate loss is borne
by the government and not by the negligent employee, when liability is im-
posed under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Thus, in United States v. Gilman,
347 U. S. 507 (1954), the government was unanimously denied indemnity
in a suit against the negligent employee.
After a ship captain had been held personally liable for a tortious seizure,
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy. 2 Cranch 64 (1804), Congress reim-
bursed the captain by private law. 6 Stat 56 (1805).
77. Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80, 95, 98 (1836).
78. Erskine v. Hohnbach, 14 Wall. 613, 615 (1871).
79. George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 380-82 (1933).
80. Powell v. Rothensies, 183 F. 2d 774 (3d Cir. 1950).
81. Wis. Stat § 285.06 (1953).
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Illinois statute applying to cities of 500,000 or more (Chicago), pro-
viding that the municipality shall indemnify a policeman for any
judgment recovered against him for injury to the person or property
of another while he is engaged in the performance of his duties as a
policeman.82 Massachusetts has another type of statute, limited to
operation of vehicles, but providing instead of mere indemnification
that the attorney general shall defend the action against the officer
or employee and that the damages shall be paid from the state treas-
ury; liability is limited to $5,000 for death of one person and $1,000
on account of damage to property, and approval of the governor and
council is required.8 3 Various kinds of arrangements for indemni-
fication of state and local officers and employees seem to be increas-
ingly common.
§5. BRINGING PROPERTY DA-MAGE WITHIN EiINENT DOMAIN OR
CONTRACT CONCEPTS
Tort claims involving adverse effects upon property may often
be brought within federal and state constitutional provisions that
property may not be taken without just compensation. A good ex-
ample is United States v. Causby,8 4 in which damages were col-
lected by the owner of a chicken farm on account of low flying of
military planes. The Court declared that "the flight of airplanes,
which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropria-
tion of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it...
The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land
that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the
land itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident to his own-
ership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same
category as invasions of the surface.""5 The Court held that the
claim was "founded upon the Constitution" and therefore within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.
82. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 24, § 1-15 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
83. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 12, § 3B (1952).
The form of the Massachusetts statute has much to commend it because
it provides protection to the officer or employee not only with respect to sub-
stantive liability but also with respect to the burden of defending the action.
Compare the statement by the Assistant Attorney General in the hearings
before the House Committee on the Federal Tort Claims bill, quoted in
United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507, 512 (1954) : "It is found that the
Government, through the Department of Justice, is constantly being called
on by the heads of the various agencies to go in and defend, we will say, a
person who is driving a mail truck when suit is brought against him for
damages or injuries caused while he was operating the truck within the
scope of his duties .... It has been found, over long years of experience, that
unless the Government is willing to go in and defend such persons the con-
sequence is a very real attack upon the morale of the services."
84. 328 U. S. 256 (1946).
85. Id. at 264-65.
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The potentialities of the doctrine that affecting use of property
may be a taking are considerable. In Idaho Mines Corp. v. United
States, 6 an order of the War Production Board dosing a mine was
held to be a taking of property supporting an action in the Court of
Claims. In holding that taking of occupancy of a wvarehouse is within
the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court asserted: "The constitu-
tional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen
may possess."87- The permanent flooding of land may be a taking
under the fifth amendment, and the intermittent flooding of land
may be the taking of an easement for intermittent flooding.s8
Cases are often lost because the practitioners presenting them
fail to see the theory of liability that could win. Suits against the
government should not necessarily be brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. A good example is Thomas v. United States.9
The plaintiffs alleged that members of the Corps of Engineers of the
War Department "carelessly and negligently planned ... the said
revetment ... to deflect and direct the flow of said current against
and upon lands of the plaintiffs.. ." Damages were sought on the
theory of negligence under the Tort Claims Act, and the court held
that the action was within the exception of "discretionary" func-
tions. If the case had been brought on the theory of a taking, apart
from the Tort Claims Act, the plaintiffs probably would have re-
covered.9 0
A temporary taking may be deemed a taking within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment, supporting an action in the Court of
Claims. In United States v. Pewee Coal Co.Y' the Court so held,
where the government took possession of a mine because a strike or
stoppage had occurred or was threatened in most of the nation's
mines. The Court divided three ways on the problem of damages,
but was unanimous in holding the fifth amendment applicable.
In many or perhaps most states, tort claims involving damage
to property may often be brought within constitutional and statutory
86. 104 F. Supp. 576 (Ct CL 1952).
87. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945).88. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799 (1950) ;
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745 (1947) ; Jacobs v. United States,
290 U. S. 13 (1933).
89. 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1949). In United States v. Ure, 225 F. 2d
709 (9th Cir. 1955), the plaintiff sought damages under the Federal TortClaims Act for the flooding of land, and lost for failure to prove negligence.90. E.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799(1950).
But under early statutes the United States may be immune from liability
for damage caused by a flood. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.
2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954).
91. 341 U. S. 114 (1951).
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arrangements for providing compensation for the taking of property.
The range of possibility of this idea is shown by an extreme Louisi-
ana decision,9 2 in which the State Live Stock Board was sued by an
owner of cattle which were killed, lost, or injured as a result of the
Board's action in dipping them in an anti-tick program. The cattle
which were killed by swallowing the dipping solution were covered
explicitly by the statutory provision, but the others were covered by
the Louisiana constitutional provision conferring the right of ade-
quate compensation for the taking of private property for public
purposes. The court declared that a state agency which has taken or
damaged private property for public purposes may be sued for com-
pensation, and that the constitutional provision is self-executing.
Another good illustration is a Vermont case9" in which dynamiting
done by a school district diverted a spring on which the plaintiff
relied for water supply; an action founded upon alleged negligence
might have failed on the theory that the activity was governmental,
but the plaintiff succeeded on the theory property had been taken
within the meaning of the constitutional provision for compensation
for property taken for a public use. In Iowa an intermittent overflow
of the plaintiff's land by reason of highway construction conducted
by the county is a taking which supports an action against the
county for compensation.9
4
Some state constitutions provide compensation not only for a
taking but also for damage to property. The Nebraska constitution
is an example: "The property of no person shall be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation therefor."90 This pro-
vision is interpreted to be self-executing, and it is "settled that one
whose property is damaged without actual taking is entitled to just
compensation."9 06 But under a similar provision of the Texas Con-
stitution, the Texas Highway Department is not liable for damage
done by a fire set by the Department's employees to burn the grass
along the shoulders of the highway, even though the Legislature has
specifically granted permission to bring the suit. In so holding the
Texas Supreme Court generalized: "If the state were suable and
liable for every tortious act of its agents, servants, and employees
committed in the performance of their official duties, there would
92. Pelt v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 178 So. 644 (La.
App. 1938). The case is interesting from the standpoint of the oft-recited
proposition that one cannot sue the state without its consent. When property is
deemed taken for public use, one can sue the state without its consent.
93. Griswold v. Town School Dist., 117 Vt. 224, 88 A. 2d 829 (1952).
94. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N. W. 2d 161
(1942). The opinion contains a good collection of authorities.
95. Neb. Const. art. I, § 21.
96. Schmutte v. State, 147 Neb. 193, 198, 22 N. W. 2d 691, 694 (1946).
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result a serious impairment of the public service and the necessary
administrative functions of government would be hampered."9 7 A
sovereign state ought not to be inconvenienced by the needs of fair-
ness and simple justice!
Even so, the Texas decision is probably in accord with most
state decisions over the nation, to the extent that the court held that
the state is immune from liability for property damage caused
by negligence, as distinguished from property damage caused by
planned activity. 8
The contrast is a queer one between liability for harm to prop-
erty under the eminent domain provisions of state constitutions and
liability for harm to persons or property under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. To a considerable extent, where the state is not liable
under eminent domain, the federal government is liable under the
Tort Claims Act, and where the federal government is not liable
under the Tort Claims Act, the state is liable under eminent domain.
Could such a result be based upon rational planning of a system?
Tort claims may sometimes be subsumed under contract liability
in circumstances in which the governmental unit is liable on its
express or implied contracts but not liable for its torts. A federal
example before enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act is the
Keifer case,,g9 where a government corporation washeld liable, de-
spite the absence of a "sue and be sued" clause in its charter, for
negligence in feeding and watering livestock. The Court acknowl-
edged that "the common law fiction of waiving the tort and suing
in assumpsit cannot be used as an evasion of the limited liability
created by the Court of Claims Acts," but it declared that "where
the wrong really derives from an undertaking, to stand on the
undertaking and to disregard the tort is not to invoke a fictive agree-
ment." 00
The overlap between contract and tort is a substantial one, and
state courts often find that a suit may succeed as a contract action,
even though it would fail as a tort action. The Michigan court, for
instance, has found: "Although the facts developed at the trial might
have justified a tort action, the claim may still properly be for dam-
ages for breach of the contract."10 '
97. Teams Highway Dep't v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 631, 219 S. ,V. 2d 70,
72 (1949).
98. See the collection of cases in Annot., 2 A. L. R. 2d 677(1948).
99. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381(1939).
100. Id. at 395.
101. Hersey Gravel Co. v. State, 305 Mich. 333, 339, 9 N. V. 2d 567,
569 (1943).
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§6. CONSTRUING AwAY PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING SUITS
Judicial responsibility for sovereign irresponsibility in tort goes
far beyond the original invention and elaboration of the immunity
doctrine. Even when legislative bodies become convinced that tort
plaintiffs should be allowed to sue the sovereign, and even when
clear and unequivocal statutes are enacted authorizing such suits, the
courts have characteristically nullified such legislation by interpret-
ing it to mean that sovereign irresponsibility must continue !
An outstanding example is a Michigan case, Manion v. State.'02
A vessel owned and operated by Michigan collided with another
vessel and injured the plaintiff. The statute set up a court of claims
and gave it jurisdiction: "To hear and determine all claims and
demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto,
against the state and any of its departments .. ." But another section
of the statute provided: "This act shall in no manner be construed
as enlarging the present liabilities of the state and any of its depart-
ments .. ." The dissenting justices thought that the state had waived
its immunity from suit and that all defenses were available except
sovereign immunity. But the majority declared: "There is a distinc-
tion between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign immunity
from liability. The latter exists when the sovereign is engaged in a
governmental function. The former may be waived without a waiver
of the latter."1 ' The court held that the statute waived immunity
from suit but not immunity from liability.
California furnishes another good example. The statute pro-
vides: "Any person who has a claim against the State (1) on
express contract, (2) for negligence, or (3) for the taking or dam-
aging of private property for public use ... shall present the claim
to the board ... If the claim is rejected or disallowed by the board,
the claimant may bring an action against the State on the claim and
prosecute it to final judgment ...,104 Another section provides that
the Controller shall draw his warrant for the payment of judg-
ments.1 5 The California courts early interpreted this statute to
mean that the state does not waive its immunity from tort liability.100
The California Supreme Court recently explained: "Thus there was
adopted in this state the doctrine that state consent to be sued for
102. 303 Mich. 1, 5 N. W. 2d 527, cert. denied, 317 U. S. 677 (1942).
103. 303 Mich. at 19, 5 N. W. 2d at 528.
104. Cal. Gov. Code Ann. § 16041 (1955).
105. Id. § 16053, applying to judgments other than claims under a pro-
vision of the Vehicle Code.
106. The decisions of 1894 and 1899 are summarized in Talley v. North-




negligence did not waive sovereign immunity from liability for
tort."'10 7 What an appalling proposition! The immunity continues
even when the state expressly consents to be sued.
Not content with that extreme position, the California Supreme
Court has gone one step further, by applying the immunity to a local
hospital district, even though the governing statute provided that
"Each hospital district shall have and exercise the following powers:
To sue and be sued in all courts and places and in all actions
and proceedings whatever." In view of the fact that the traditional
doctrine is that the sovereign may not be sued without consent, and
in view of the explicit and clear enactment that the hospital district
could be sued, the court's statement is indeed a strange one that
"Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be modified in
this state is a legislative question."'1 8 A dissenting justice vehe-
mently protested against "the archaic, outmoded, unfair and dis-
criminatory doctrine of governmental immunity blindly followed by
the majority..."109
Commentators have pointed out that "enactment of statutes au-
thorizing suits against the state or its subdivisions by all persons
having claims against them has very little bearing upon tort liability
or responsibility. In at least seventeen states there are or have been
such enactments which have been interpreted as merely permitting
the filing of suits or claims, but as having no effect upon the sub-
stantive right to collect claims."'110 In some of the seventeen states,
however, the statutes rather clearly were not intended to alter sover-
eign immunity.'
Another form of statute specifically provides that municipalities
"shall be liable." Such a statute, believe it or not, is sometimes read
107. People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 759, 178 P. 2d 1, 4 (1947).
108. Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital Dist., 41 Cal. 2d
33, 41, 257 P. 2d 22, 27 (1953).
109. Ibid.
Another good example of judicial failure to take advantage of opportunity
to limit liability is Wickman v. Housing Authority, 196 Ore. 100, 247 P. 2d
630 (1952). A lessee sued for fire damage allegedly caused by the Housing
Authority's negligence. A statute gave the Authority power to sue and be sued.
The court nevertheless held the Authority immune from liability.
110. Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States. 29 N. 1% U.
L. Rev. 1363, 1408 (1954). The states listed are Arizona, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin.
111. E.g., the Massachusetts statute seems to go to jurisdiction and not
to sovereign immunity or to consent to be sued: "The superior court...
shall have jurisdiction of all claims at law or in equity against the common-
wealth." Mass. Ann. Laws c. 258, § 1 (1952). The explanation of the occa-
sion for the enactment, in Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152
Mass. 28,24 N. E. 854 (1939) seems rather persuasive that the intent ws not
a general waiver of sovereign immunity.
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to mean that a municipality shall not be liable. An outstanding ex-
ample is a decision by the California Supreme Court.1 12 The statute
provided:
"Counties, municipalities, and school districts shall be liable
for injuries to persons and property resulting from dangerous
or defective condition of public streets, highways, buildings.
grounds, works and property in all cases where the governing
.. board ... or other board, officer or person having authority
to remedy such condition, had knowledge or notice of the defec-
tive or dangerous condition . . . and failed or neglected, for a
reasonable time.., to remedy such condition..."
Plaintiffs alleged that the city officials failed to maintain certain
fire-fighting equipment in condition for effective use, that the city
officials knew of the condition and failed to correct it, and that as a
result they suffered damages from a fire. The court held that a
demurrer was properly sustained, because : "Upon analysis, it clearly
appears that the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is the failure of a
governmental function. Such failure involves the denial of a benefit
owing to the community as a whole, but it does not constitute a
wrong or injury to a member thereof so as to give rise to a right of
individual redress, Restatement of Torts, §288, which right must be
predicated upon the violation of a duty of care owed to the injured
party."" 3 The court quoted from American Jurisprudence the prop-
osition that a municipality is not liable for negligence in failing to
extinguish a fire. The court seemingly was indifferent to the simple
fact that neither the Restatement nor the quotation from American
Jurisprudence was written in the light of a statute specifically pro-
viding for liability. The court further pointed out that a private
water company would not be liable in New York in the same cir-
cumstances,"' and declared that "it does not seem reasonable to
construe the Public Liability Act as intended to impose a greater
liability on the city than would prevail against an individual or a
private corporation charged with negligence in the administration
112. Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P. 2d 980 (1952).
113. Id. 489, 240 P. 2d at 982.
114. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E.
896 (1928). A dissenting opinion in the California case pointed out that thc
New York decision has been adversely criticized by Seavey, Cardozo api( the
Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 392 (1939): "Cardozo speaks of the
failure of the water company as if it were merely a failure to confer a benefit
upon the injured householder, and in denying liability relies upon the recog-
nized principle that one is under no duty to confer a benefit upon anotlwr. Of
course, the plaintiff did not complain of the failure to receive a benefit. Hi.
real ground was that, because of reliance upon the undertaking of the %valte
company to maintain an adequate pressure at the hydrants, the city had fail-,,
to make other provision for the protection of its citizens, and the plaintiff.
among others, being lulled into a false sense of security, had failed indi
vidually to take measures to protect his property."
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of its fire protection."'1 5 A dissenting opinion emphasized that the
statute provided that "cities shall be liable for any injuries to any
person or property resulting from the dangerous or defective condi-
tion of its property or works. ' I1
Surely when a court construes away such an unequivocal statu-
tory provision, the judicial responsibility for governmental irrespon-
sibility is very grave indeed.
§7. THE GOVERNMENTAL-PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION
The cehtral idea in the law of municipal tort liability is that a
municipality is liable for its torts in the exercise of proprietary but
not governmental functions. California applies the distinction to
liability of the state ;17 except for the patchwork of legislative
changes, other states generally are immune from liability whether
the activity is governmental or proprietary. To the extent that the
governmental-proprietary distinction produces municipal respon-
sibility that might not otherwise exist, the distinction makes for
justice; liability for some municipal torts is to be preferred to
liability for no municipal torts. One might easily assume, as the
Supreme Court in a formal opinion recently assumed, that the dis-
tinction reflects an attempt to escape from sovereign immunity, but
the historical fact is that before the judicial invention of the distinc-
tion, liability was usually imposed upon municipalities without re-
gard to the distinction.lls
115. 38 Cal. 2d at 491, 240 P. 2d at 983.
116. Id. at 493, 240 P. 2d at 984. Two of the seven justices dissented.
117. The leading case is Green v. State, 73 CaL 29, 14 Pac. 610 (1887).
State liability for proprietary functions has been recognized in Guide v.
State, 41 Cal. 2d 623, 262 P. 2d 3 (1953) (display at state fair) ; People v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P. 2d 1 (1947) (state-operated railroad).
118. The Court said in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S.
61, 65 (1955) : "The fact of the matter is that the theory whereby municipali-
ties are made amenable to liability is an endeavor, however awkward and
contradictory, to escape from the basic historical doctrine of sovereign im-
munity."
The outstanding case initiating the distinction is Bailey v. City of New
York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
For a sample of the older law, see Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 Fed. Cas. 461,
Case No. 6,666 (Cir. Ct. D. C. 1802), assuming municipal liability for filling
up and raising the street, so as to obstruct the doors and windows of plain-
tiffs' warehouse.
For further citations in support of the statement that "In the earliest re-
ported American cases noticed it was simply assumed without argument, as a
matter of course, that a [municipal] corporation wvas subject to action for
tort," see Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction between Public and
Private Functions it Respect to the Comninon-Law Tort Liability of Municitpal
Corporations, 16 Ore L. Rev. 250, 251 (1937). See also the several dozen
old cases, id. at 259 n. 35, including Goodloe v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500. 513-14(1831) : "When the corporation of a town grade the streets, the object is
the benefit of the whole town. If an individual is injured, it is right he should
have redress, against all upon whose account the injury was perpetrated."
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The distinction is probably one of the most unsatisfactory known
to the law, for it has caused confusion not only among the vari-
ous jurisdictions but almost always within each jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court of the United States declared in 1937:
"There probably is no topic of the law in respect of which the
decisions of the state courts are in greater conflict and confusion
than that which deals with the differentiation between the gov-
ernmental and corporate powers of municipal corporations. This
condition of conflict and confusion is confined in the main to
decisions relating to liability in tort for the negligence of officers
and agents of the municipality. In that field, no definite rule can
be extracted from the decisions."'1"
In 1955 a majority of five justices spoke of "the 'non-govern-
mental'-'governmental' quagmire that has long plagued the law of
municipal corporations. A comparative study of the cases in the
forty-eight States will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than
that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and dis-
close the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that
is inherently unsound."'1 20
An especially good illustration of the distinction in action is
Hoogard v. City of Richmond,'2' in which the Virginia court pro-
ceeded with unusual care and thoroughness. The plaintiff was
injured when her hand struck a barbed-wire fence while in a swim-
ming pool owned and operated by the city of Richmond. The court
announced at the outset:
"The general law, as interpreted by the courts in all but two
states (South Carolina and Florida) ,122 is that a municipality
is clothed with two-fold functions; one governmental, and the
other private or proprietary. In the performance of a govern-
mental function, the municipality acts as an agency of the state
119. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 (1937).
120. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 65 (1955). The
four dissenting justices, however, would have adopted the distinction under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, as the majority of the Court had done in Dale-
hite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 28 (1953), when the Court said that "it
was not contemplated [by the Tort Claims Act] that the Government should
be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental nature or function."
121. 172 Va. 145, 200 S. E. 610 (1939).
122. Later in the opinion the court said that South Carolina "recog-
nized the confusion in its own jurisdiction and the confusion in other juris-
dictions, and finally held that a municipality, in the absence of statute, was
not liable for tort in any event." The court cited Irvine v. Town of Green-
wood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228 (1952). For a sample of the present South
Carolina law under a special statute changing the result of the Irvine case,
see Hicks v. City of Columbia, 225 S. C. 553, 83 S. E. 2d 199 (1954).
As to Florida the court cited cases to show full rejection of the im-
munity, including Wolfe v. Miami, 103 Fla. 774, 134 So. 539, 137 So. 892(1931). Florida has later recognized the immunity; a city is not liable for the
third degree administered by police officers. City of Miami v. Bethel.
... Fla ..., 65 So. 2d 34 (1953). The concurring and dissenting opinions in
this case are especially interesting.
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to enable it to better govern that portion of its people residing
with its corporate limits.... There is granted to a municipal cor-
poration, in its corporate and proprietary character, privileges
and powers to be exercised for its private advantage. In the per-
formance of these duties the general public may derive a common
benefit, but they are granted and assumed primarily for the bene-
fit of the corporation."'"
This statement is about as clear a guide as any. The basic reason
for the confusion can quickly be detected if this guide is used to
determine whether operation of a swimming pool is governmental
or proprietary.
The court accurately said: "While this distinction is generally
recognized, the difficulty arises in the application of the rule to
various municipal activities." -1 24 The court, very naturally, turned
away from an attempt to extract its conclusion from the guide it
had laid down; instead, it made a survey of the previous Virginia,
cases, attempting to find the conclusion by analogy. It cited the vari-
ous Virginia decisions for the propositions that a municipality acts
governmentally in operating a hospital, regulating the use of side-
walks and streets, maintaining a jail, maintaining a police force,
operating the Eastern State Hospital "for the protection of society,
and for the promotion of the best interests of the unfortunate citi-
zens," removing garbage, and establishing a park and playground.
Then the court cited the cases holding that a municipality acts in its
proprietary capacity in construction, repair, improvement or mainte-
nance of its streets and sidewalks; in the operation of a wharf; in
changing the grade of its street level; in controlling surface water;
and in conducting public utilities, such as water, sewerage systems,
gas, and light.
Without making clear, except by the citations, where the line
was drawn, the court observed: "This general line of demarcation
between immunity and liability of a municipal corporation has been
followed with more or less consistency in this jurisdiction for more
than a century."'-2 5
The court quoted from a Massachusetts opinion: "The under-
lying test is whether the act is for the common good of all without
the element of special corporate benefit, or pecuniary profit. If it
is, there is no liability; if it is not, there may be liability."'M0 No
wonder this distinction causes confused law! If this "underlying
test' is applied to the cases the court discussed, then garbage re-
123. 172 Va. at 147, 200 S. E. at 611.
124. Id. at 148, 200 S. E. at 611.
125. Id. at 150, 200 S. F_ at 612.
126. Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 390, 114 N. E. 722, 724(1917).
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moval is "for the common good of all," but sewage removal is not -
a hospital is "for the common good of all," but a waterworks is not.
How could the Virginia court get any guidance from this test and
these precedents on the question whether the swimming pool was
"for the common good of all"?
After demonstrating its own earlier inconsistency, the Virginia
court declared: "These quotations ... illustrate the difficulty of
basing the distinction of the two functions on any logical reasoning.
The same inconsistent and illogical holding of courts from other
jurisdictions is apparent from a study of the cases."' 27 The court
discussed the cases, including an opinion of the Supreme Court that
municipalities are not liable for negligence "in the exercise of the
police power, or in the performance of such municipal faculties as
the erection and maintenance of a city hall and courthouse, the pro-
tection of the city's inhabitants against disease and unsanitary condi-
tions, the care of the sick, the operation of fire departments, the
inspection of steam boilers, the promotion of education and the ad-
ministration of public charities," but they are liable when they "build
and maintain bridges, streets and highways. and waterworks, con-
struct sewers, collect refuse and care for tile dump where it is
deposited."-1 2 8
Having developed this background, the Virginia court came to
grips with its problem. Is a swimming pool governmental or pro-
prietary? Is it like a hospital and "for the good of all," or is it like
a waterworks and for "special corporate benefit ?"
The only possibly correct answer to such a question as this is
that the question is unanswerable- but the court unfortunately
thought it had to answer. One might suppose that the closet analogy
is to the park or playground, but the court found its analagy in the
waterworks : "Furnishing water to the inhabitants of a municipality
for domestic purposes, and Furnishing water to inhabitants to be
used for the purpose of public swimming and bathing, are closely
allied activities. Each activity tends to promote the health and hap-
piness of its inhabitants. ' 12 9 Then is the swimming pool gov-
ernmental or proprietary? The swimming pool promotes health and
happiness, and what is "for the common good of all" is govern-
mental. But the waterworks is proprietary.
The court held the swimming pool proprietary because operating
127. 172 Va. at 151, 200 S. E. at 613.
Compare the account of the illogicality and inconstentency of Pennsyl-
vania decisions in the dissenting opinion in Boorse v. Springfield Township,
377 Pa. 109, 103 A 2d 708 (1954).
128. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 191 (1923).
129. 172 Va. at 156. 200 S. E. at 615.
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the pool is like furnishing water for domestic purposes and "To
hold a municipality liable for tort when engaged in one of these
activities, and immune from liability when engaged in the other, is
obviously unsound."'130
Two of the seven justices dissented, asserting that "the collection
of garbage, being for the common good and without the element of
pecuniary profit, is a governmental function. Td my mind, the oper-
ation of free parks or playgrounds and swimming pools for the
recreation and upbuilding of the health of our children is just as
essential to the common good as the collection of garbage.""'' If the
test is, as the dissenters said, what is "essential to the common
good," and if a swimming pool is essential to the common good, then
all of the functions mentioned in the majority opinion are govern-
mental -hospitals, jails, police, playgrounds, streets, waterworks,
sewerage systems, gas and light facilities.
But if, as the Virginia court had previously held in various
cases, streets, sidewalks, and sewerage systems are proprietary and
therefore "of special corporate benefit," then surely parks and play-
grounds, including swimming pools, must also be proprietary.
This single Virginia case is a fair sample of the utterly un-
satisfactory distinction. The confusion reflected in the single opinion
is multiplied many times by the plurality of cases in each state and
by the plurality of states. Collections of the cases are readily avail-
able. 32 So many law review articles have been written on the sub-
ject13' that one of the most useful articles is a survey of the liter-
130. Id. at 156, 200 S. E. at 615.
131. Id. at 159, 200 S. E. at 616.
132. E.g., annotations on municipal liability for negligence in insect or
vermin eradication, 25 A. L. R. 2d 1057 (1952) ; hospitals, 25 A. L. R. 2d 203
(1952) ; garage for maintenance and repair of municipal vehicles, 26 A. L. R.
2d 944 (1952) ; parking meters, 33 A. L. R. 2d 761 (1954) ; parking facilities,
8 A. L. R. 2d 397 (1949) ; flood protection measures, 5 A. L. R. 2d 84 (1949);
cleaning and sprinkling streets, 156 A. L. I. 692 (1945); inspection of
motor vehicles, 133 A. L. R. 1216 (1941) ; poor relief activities, 134 A. L. R.
763 (1941) ; municipal immunity, 120 A. L. I. 1376 (1939).
133. Some selected articles: Borchard, Governnit Liability in Tort,
34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25) ; 36 id. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27); 28 Colurn.
L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928) ; David, Municipal Liability in Tort in California,
6 So. Calif. L. Rev. 269, 7 id. 48, 214, 295, 372 (1933) ; Feezer, Capacity to
Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decisions in, Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 810 (1930) ; Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in
Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Green, Municipal Liability for
Torts, 38 IM. L. Rev. 355 (1944); Harno, Tort Imnnunity of Municipal Cor-
porations, 4 Ill. L. Q. 28 (1921) ; James, Tort Liability of Governinental Units
and Their Officers, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610 (1955): Seasonwood, Municipal
Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietar, Test, 22 Va.
L. Rev. 910 (1936); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41(1949); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev.
97, 100 (1932); Warp, The Law and Admninistration of .1funicipal Tort
Liability, 28 Va. L. Rev. 630 (1942).
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ature.1 3 4 The survey shows that police and fire departments are
almost always classed as governmental, and furnishing of water, gas,
and electricity almost always proprietary. Sewers and garbage dis-
posal are mixed and confused, and what is called "the undoubted
weight of authority" classes streets, sidewalks and bridges as pro-
prietary. But liability is generally denied for negligent operation of
traffic signals. "A numerical majority of the cases" classify parks,
swimming pools and recreation centers as governmental, but the
later cases may be the other way. Education is generally govern-
mental, and municipal airports are proprietary but !egislatures are
tending to curb liability for operation of airports, even though the
broader tendency of legislation is said to be away from municipal
immunity.
The absurdity of the classification is increased when proprietary
or governmental characteristics of an activity are mixed. As one
writer has observed," ' one state has both governmental elec-
tricity and proprietary electricity, " ' and another state has both
governmental manholes and proprietary manholes.' But what if
the same manhole serves both governmental purposes and pro-
prietary purposes? That question arose concerning an elevator in a
City-County Building which carried people to governmental and
propretary and mixed offices; the court despaired of its task of try-
ing to "unscramble the mixed relations" and it held: "The fact that
some of the activities centered in this building are exclusively of a
purely governmental nature will not affect liability, when they are
joined with business activities."' 38 What a preposterous problem!
Municipal immunity from tort liability may possibly be shrink-
ing as time goes on." 9 The Texas Supreme Court has cited cases to
support its statement that "This doctrine of immunity has been often
criticized and questioned ... and the present tendency of the courts
134. Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal
Tort Liability, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942). See also the various
other articles in the symposium in the same issue.
135. Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41, 44-45 (1949).
136. According to an old Michigan case, negligence in maintaining wires
for lighting homes makes the city liable, but not negligence in maintaining
wires for lighting streets and public buildings. Hodgins v. Bay City. 156
Mich. 687, 121 N. W. 274 (1909).
137. In Georgia the city is liable for negligence concerning water pipes
going to homes but not for those supplying water to a pool in a public park.
Autrey v. City Council of Augusta, 33 Ga. App. 757, 127 S. E. 796 (1925) :
City Council of Augusta v. Cleveland, 23 Ga. App. 522, 98 S. E. 738 (1919).
138. Bell v. City of Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 190, 146 AtI. 567, 568
(1929).
139. Compare Fordham. Local Government Law 1022 (1949): "For




is to restrict this doctrine of non-liability and construe it strictly
against the city."' 14 0 Exceptions to the basic doctrine may signify
some movement away from immunity. Thus, even if the activity
is governmental, a city may be liable for nuisance. For instance, a
city was liable for injuries caused by the fall of an ornamental
cannon in a public park;' 4' the court quoted from an earlier case:
"A municipality, while not liable for negligence of its agents and
employees engaged in the exercise of its governmental functions,
may be liable for a nuisance which they create."' 4 -
Such exceptions and restrictions may be all to the good, but
nothing short of complete excision of the governmental-proprietary
distinction from the law can be wholly satisfactory.
§ 8. THE FEDERAL ToRT CLAIMS AcT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The federal government has long been moving toward sovereign
responsibility for tort,14 3 and the longest step of all was taken in the
Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946,'" but a good bit of the distance
to full responsibility is yet to be traveled, as the various exceptions
to the Tort Claims Act make clear.
The key affirmative provision is: "The United States shall be
liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims,
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior
140. City of Houston v. Shilling, 150 Tex. 387, 391-92, 240 S. M. 2d
1010, 1012 (1951).
A federal district court in Alaska, in holding a city liable for negligence
in operating a hospital, declared somewhat optimistically in a good opinion:
"Immunity from suit is in disfavor in the United States because it is an
anomaly in a republic and because of the general recognition of the fact that
it is unjust to make the innocent victims of negligence bear the entire loss
rather than to distribute the burden among the members of the general public. '
Tuengel v. City of Sitka, 118 F. Supp. 399, 400 (D. Alaska 1954).
141. Prifty v. City of Waterbury, 133 Conn. 654, 54 A. 2d 260 (1947).
142. Karnasiewica v. New Britain, 131 Conn. 691, 694, 42 A. 2d 32, 33(1945). See Annot., 75 A. L. R. 1196 (1931), on municipal liability for
nuisance. This use of the nuisance concept is an old one. E.g., .Miles v. Wor-
cester, 154 Mass. 511, 228 N. E. 676 (1891).
143. See the account of the piecemeal legislation in § 3 above.
144. The original statute is 60 Stat. 842 (1946). To begin with this
reference and to find the statute in the code is bewildering, because the 1948
codification has distributed it rather widely. The Act is 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291,
1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-78. 2680 (1952).
The Act as it now reads provides that district courts 'shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States .... "
28 U. S. C. 1346(b) (1952). The original Act, 60 Stat. 843 (1946), provided
in § 140 that the district courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear.
determine, and render judgment on any claims against the United States...."
The Court pointed out this change in observing that changes in language were
made in the codification, and the Court said: "We attribute to this change
of language no substantive change of law." Feres -. United States, 340 U. S.
135, 140 (1950).
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to judgment or for punitive damages.""' As we shall see, one of the
large problems of interpretation is whether the government can be
liable for governmental activities having no private counterpart, or
whether the words "to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances" limit substantive liability.
The key provision is supplemented with a provision conferring
jurisdiction upon the district courts of civil actions on claims against
the United States "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."'' 40
This provision takes care of the great bulk of tort claims result-
ing from the operation of government vehicles. But plaintiffs hurt
by government vehicles are not as well protected as plaintiffs hurt
by corporations' vehicles, for if the drivers are outside the scope of
employment, the government usually is not liable, whereas in at
least ten jurisdictions employers are liable if the vehicle is used with
the employer's consent, 14 ; and the typical "omnibus clause" in a
private and commercial accident liability policy insures tile employee
who drives with the consent of the employer.
The Act contains thirteen explicit exceptions,"" two of which
are of major importance. The limited or minor exceptions relate to
postal matter, collection of taxes and customs duties, admiralty,
Trading with the Enemy Act, quarantines, vessels passing through
the Panama Canal or in Canal Zone waters, fiscal operations of the
Treasury or regulation of the monetary system, combatant activities
during wartime, claims arising in a foreign country, activities of
145. 28 U. S. C. § 2674 (1952).
The Act provides, 28 U. S. C. § 2672 (1952), for administrative handling
of claims of $1,000 or less.
146. 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (1952).
147. See Note, Respondeat Superior in Attomobile Ncgliqe,e-An,
Anomaly in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 61 Yale L. J. 435, 436 (1952). The
ten jurisdictions listed are California, District of Columbia, Idaho. Iowa.
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Florida
reaches the same result without statute.
A good example of nonliability of the government where a private em-
ployer would be liable is Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (N.).
Fla. 1948). A soldier assigned as a chauffeur was told his services were not
needed, and he drove the Army staff car to a neighboring city instead of back
to the base. The court said: "Under the substantive law of Florida knowledge
and consent of the owner of the use of an automobile on the highway by
another imposes liability for the negligent operation of it, no matter where the
driver goes." Id. at 82. But the court held the government not liable because
the accident was outside the scope of employment under the Tort Claims Act.
148. All the exceptions are in 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (1952).
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the Tennessee Valley Authority, and activities of the Panama Rail-
road Company. Some of these exceptions involve claims for which
the government is otherwise liable.14 9 Others, such as claims for
damages caused by quarantines, are hard to explain.Y50
One of the major exceptions is for "Any claim arising out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights."1 1 Although statements have been
often made that the Act does not subject the government to liability
for willful or deliberate torts, the statements are inaccurate, for the
list does not include such important torts as trespass and conversion.
An illegal search and seizure by federal agents may involve both
trespass and conversion, for which the government may be liable. '5-
The government may be liable for the willful tort of invasion of
privacy when federal agents unlawfully tap wires. The government
may be liable for violation of a copyright."' Plaintiffs' attorneys,
with a little imagination, may discover a good many willful torts
that are outside the exceptions. A claimant in Illinois alleged that
he had been convicted of rape because the state's attorney had sup-
149. The exception for loss of mail should be read in the light of a pro-
vision for liability with respect to registered mail. 29 Stat. 559 (1897), 39
U. S. C. § 381 (1952). The exception with respect to admiralty is limited to
claims for which remedies are otherwise provided. The exception concerning
the Trading with the Enemy Act is at least to some extent offset by other
remedies. The Panama Canal exception is offset by provisions of the Canal
Zone Code allowing suit against the Governor of the Canal Zone.
Claims arising in a foreign country are taken care of by other statutes,including especially 49 Stat. 1138 (1936), 31 U. S. C. § 224a (1952).
According to a district court, the TVA wras exempted from the Act "at
its own request on the ground that it was already subject to suit and certain of
the procedural aspects of the Act would be burdensome." Atchley v. TVA,
69 F. Supp. 952, 955 (N.D. Ala. 1947). The TVA has been held immune front
liability for damage done by setting off explosives, on the theory that tie
acts were "in the performance of a discretionary governmental duty." Pacific
Nat Fire Ins. Co. v. TVA, 89 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1950).
150. In its opinion in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 44 (1953).
the Court said: "To impos6 liability for the alleged nonfeasance of the Coast
Guard would be like holding the United States liable in tort for failure to
impose a quarantine for, let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease."
The difficulty the Court evidently feels is in finding an affirmative legal duty.
But if government agents act affirmatively and negligently inflict injur, .no
reason is apparent for not imposing liability-except the express provision
of the Act.
151. 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h) (1952).
152. In Hatahley v. United States, 351 U. S. 173 (1956), the govern-
ment was held liable for the deliberate and wrongful act of a range managerin destroying horses of the Indian plaintiffs. The Court pointed out that the
Act provides for liability for "wrongful" as well as "negligent" acts, and
declared that the acts were "wrongful trespasses not involving discretion."
351 U. S. 181.
153. See O'Donoghue, Some Possible Area, Fields in a .Varro-wing .e1!,
7 Vand. L. Rev. 180 (1954), an especially provocative article.
1956]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
pressed evidence and had introduced false testimony; although the
Illinois Court of Claims denied the claim,'5 4 the Federal Tort Claims
Act does not necessarily bar such a claim, for the tort alleged is
neither false arrest nor false imprisonment, but false conviction.
New York State has been held liable for unauthorized use of a pic-
ture of the plaintiff in advertising a state-operated ski resort; such
a tort is apparently not within the exceptions to the Tort Claims
Act.15
5
The legislative history contains a thoroughly unpersuasive
reason for excepting the specified willful torts. These torts were
called "a type of torts which would be difficult to make a defense
against, and which are easily exaggerated. For that reason it seemed
to those who framed this bill that it would be safe to exclude those
types of torts, and those should be settled on the basis of private
acts." 15 Negligent acts are as hard to defend and are as easily ex-
aggerated. Juries are not used in any claims against the government.
A remark of commentators about the excepted willful torts seems
fully justified: "No persuasive reason has even been advanced for
their having been excluded from the reach of the Tort Claims
A c t .'215
The provision concerning the specified willful torts exempts the
government not only from liability for committing the specified
torts but it exempts the government from liability for "Any claim
arising out of" the specified torts. A reasonable interpretation of
this may be seen in Duenges v. United States.' 8 The plaintiff, after
honorable discharge from the Army, was arrested and imprisoned
for desertion. In his suit he alleged that the government negligently
maintained its records, thereby injuring him. The court held that
154. Montgomery v. Illinois, 21 Il. Ct. Cl. 205 (1952).
155. Seidelman v. State, 202 Misc. 817, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 380 (Ct. Cl.
1952).
156. Testimony of Alexander Holtzoff, representing the Department of
Justice, before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. on S. 2690, p. 39 (1940).
157. Gellhorn and Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property
Damage, 29 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1325, 1341 (1954).
158. 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
Another such case is Moos v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Mimn.
1954). The surgeon in the Veterans' Hospital operated on the wrong leg.
thereby delaying the needed operation a month. The court held the government
not liable because the action "arose out of" assault and battery.
In Morton v. United States, 228 F. 2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1955), the allega-
tion was that various high officers, including the Attorney General, con-
spired to hold plaintiff as a mental defective. The court denied relief under
the "discretionary functions" exception, and said that to the extent that the
complaint otherwise sounds in tort, it came within the exception of arising
out of false imprisonment. The plaintiff would have had a better chance of
winning by alleging negligence, not conspiracy, not willful action.
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the claim "arises out of false imprisonment and false arrest" within
the meaning of the Act and therefore the government was immune.
The case shows the double need for amending the Act.
The remaining exception, far the most important, goes to the
heart of the problem of government tort liability: "Any claim based
upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercis-
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused."'' -9 The principal difficulties of interpretation involve the
last part of this exception, in combination with the provision for
liability "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances." We shall explore these diffi-
culties in the ensuing sections.
§9. Tha Dalehite CASE
The two germinal cases are Dalehite v. United States10 and
and Indiaim Towing Co. v. United States.10 ' The whole body of law
affected by these cases is necessarily somewhat unsteady, not only
because Dalehite was four to three and Indian Towing five to four,
but also because the two cases are to some extent inconsistent with
each other. Many lower court decisions influenced by the earlier
Dalehite case are questionable authorities to the enxtent that Indian
Towing is inconsistent with Dalehite.
The Dalehite case held the government not liable for the Texas
City disaster, which killed 560 people, injured 3,000, and caused
property damage running into many millions of dollars. Claims were
159. 28 U.S. C. § 2680(a) (1952).
160. 346 U. S. 15 (1953).
161. 350 U. S. 61 (1955).
Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950) is not a germinal case in its
holding that injuries to military personnel "incident to the service" are not
actionable because Congress has provided "systems of simple, certain, and
uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services," and
because "We do not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a new
cause of action dependent on Local law for service-connected injuries or
death due to negligence." More general language in the Feres opinion had
impact on other cases, but it is superseded by the holding in the bidian Towing
case.
Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427 (1952) held that a remedy under
the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742 (1916), 5 U. S. C.§ 751 (1952), precludes a suit for damages under the Public Vessels Act, 43
Stat 1112 (1925), 46 U. S. C. § 781 (1952).
A statute now provides that workmen's compensation for federal em-
ployees "shall be exclusjve, and in place, of all other liability of the United
States .... "58 Stat. 312 (1944), 5 U. S. C. § 757(b) (1952).
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presented aggregating two hundred million dollars. A ship loaded
with fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate exploded in the harbor. The
plaintiffs claimed negligence "substantially on the part of tile entire
body of federal officials and employees involved in a program of
production of the material," 1 2 which was being produced for
foreign use as a part of a foreign aid program. The district court
made findings of government negligence in planning, in manufactur-
ing, in supervising storage, and in fire fighting. The Court held that
even if the findings were correct, "it is our judgment that they (to
not establish a case within the Act."16"
Discussing the negligence in planning, that is, in drafting and
adopting the fertilizer export program, the Court examined the
legislative history and then generalized very broadly that "it was
not contemplated that the Government should be subject to liability
arising from acts of a governmental nature or function." '' The
Court reiterated: "One only need read § 2680 [the thirteen ex-
ceptions] in its entirety to conclude that Congress exercised care to
protect the Government from claims, however negligently caused,
that affected the governmental functions."1 5 These two statements
seem to involve adoption of the governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion which has long confused the law of municipal liability.'" But
the two statements are supported neither by the words of § 268010 7
nor by the legislative history.Y0 As we shall see, the Court took
162. 346 U. S. at 18.
163. Id. at 24.
164. Id. at 28.
165. Id. at 32.
166. See discussion of that distinction in § 7 above.
167. The concept of "governmental functions" is drawn from the la%%
of municipal corporations, not from § 2680, which does not use the concept.
Instead, § 2680 uses the concept of "a discretionary function."
The court said of § 2680(a) : "It excepts acts of discretion in the per-
formance of governmental functions or duty 'whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.'" 346 U. S. at 33. The idea of "performance of govern-
mental functions" is not expressed by § 2680(a) ; that provision excepts "tile
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
The term "governmental" and the term "discretionary" are far from
synonymous, for the term "governmental" in the tort context signifies the
concept used in the law of municipal liability.
168. See the Court's discussion of the legislative history, 346 U. S. at
26-27. Nothing the Court sets out says anything about "acts of a governmental
nature or function." The principal ideas are that the government should not be
liable for "a legally authorized activity," merely because "the same conduct
by a private individual would be tortious," and that it was not "intended that
the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations, or the pro-
priety of a discretionary administrative act, should be tested through the
medium of a damage suit for tort."
What is perhaps the strongest support in the legislative history for the
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precisely the opposite position in the Indian Towing case. 69
The district court had found negligence in manufacture in four-
respects - bagging temperature (cooling inside the bag is slow),
type of bagging (paper), labeling (no warning of explosive
character), and PRP coating (each granule covered with mixture
of paraffin, rosin, and petrolatum, to insure against water absorp-
tion). The Supreme Court disposed of these findings by saying that
the acts were "under the direction of a plan developed at a high
level under a direct delegation of plan-making authority from the
apex of the Executive Department."'170
The Court's reason for nonliability in this aspect of the case
was: "The decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a
planning rather, than operational level and involved considerations
more or less important to the practicability of the Government's
fertilizer program.""7 ' This pronouncement is especially important
because it is substantially uncontradicted by the dissenting opinion
and untouched by the Indian Towing case. The dissenting justices
agreed with immunity at a high planning level when they said:
"The common sense of this matter is that a policy adopted in the
exercise of an immune discretion was carried out carelessly by those
in charge of detail. We cannot agree that all the way down the line
there is immunity for every balancing of care against cost, of safety
against production, of warning against silence."''
The concept of "a planning rather than operational level" is im-
portant and may be destined to become a landmark in law develop-
ment.
Court's conclusion was not mentioned in the opinion. A statement was made
in the hearings that the Act would "place the United States, in respect of
torts committed by its agents, upon the same footing as a private corporate
employer, with certain limitations required for the protection of important
governmental functions.' Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary of the
House on HR. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1942). But even
this statement falls far short of an adoption of the governmental-proprietary
distinction.
169. See the discussion below in § 10. The dissenting justices in the
Indian. Towing case asserted the position here taken by the majority.
170. 346 U. S. at pages 39-40.
To show that the choice of PRP was discretionary, the Court said: "At
stake was no mere matter of taste; ammonium nitrate when wet cakes and is
difficult to spread on fields as a fertilizer. So the considerations that dictated
the decisions were crucial ones, involving the feasibility of the program itself,
balanced against present knowledge of the effect of such a coating and the
general custom of similar private industries." Id. at 40.
171. Id. at 42.
172. Id. at 58. Later the dissenters said: "The Governnent's negligence
here was not in policy decisions of a regulatory or governmental nature, but




Much less satisfactory was the Court's disposition of the finding
that the Coast Guard and other agencies were negligent in failing to
prevent the fire by regulating storage or loading of the fertilizer in
some different fashion. The Court somewhat summarily announced,
on the basis of cases cited, that courts traditionally refuse to ques-
tion judgments on which regulations rest."'3
The disposition of the finding of negligence in fighting the fire
is both intrinsically unpersuasive and inconsistent with the Court's
later opinion in the Indian Towving case. The Court asserted: "The
Act did not create new causes of action where none existed before
... It did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure or care-
lessness of public firemen does not create private actionable rights.
... [I]n fact, if anything is doctrinally sanctified in the law of torts
it is the immunity of communities and other public bodies for in-
juries due to fighting fire."' 74 This language is highly vulnerable.
The Court seems to be saying that it will not give effect to the
statute because the common law is contrary to the statute. The
statute provides that "The United States shall be liable ... in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances . . ." In the sense in which the words are used in
the Dalehite opinion, the statute clearly did create new causes of
action where none existed before. Before the enactment, one hurt
by the negiigence of the driver of a government vehicle had no
cause of action against the government, but under the Act he does.
Yet one could say equally of government vehicles, as the Court says
of fire fighting, that if anything was doctrinally sanctified in the law
of torts it was the immunity of government for injuries due to opera-
tion of government vehicles. What has been sanctified, both with
respect to fire fighting and with respect to driving government
173. See the discussion below in § 17 on Some Musings about Long-
Range Objectives.
174. 346 U. S. at 43-44.
The Court's unfortunate language is based upon the opinion in Feres v.
United States. 340 U. S. 135, 141 (1950), where the Court quoted the provi-
sion that the United States "shall be liable... in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . ." and said:
"It will be seen that this is not the creation of new causes of action but
acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private liability
into existence. . . .Its effect is to waive immunity from recognized causes
of action and was not to visit the Government with novel and unprecedented
liabilities."
It is hardly "novel and unprecedented" if those who employ men to drive
trucks or to fight fires are subject to liability for negligence of the men
within the scope of their employment.
This language of the Indian Towing case is superseded by the holding




vehicles, must yield to the enactment that "The United States shall
be liable . . ." Fires are fought both by public employees and by
private employees, just as vehicles are driven both by public em-
ployees and by private employees. When a corporation's employees
fight a fire, the corporation is liable for their negligence in the scope
of their employment. WVhen the government's employees fight a fire,
the government is liable for their negligence in the scope of their
employment, because the statute provides that the government "shall
be liable.., in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances..."
This aspect of the Dalehdte opinion seems clearly unsound.'--
Happily, the Court in the Indian Towing case has either overruled
this aspect of Dalehite or has limited it to its narrow facts, as we
shall now see.
§10. THE Ivdian Towing CASE AND SYNTHESIS WITH Dalehite
The Indian Towing case 7 ( was an action against the government
for damages resulting from failure of a lighthouse light on account
of negligent maintenance of the light by the Coast Guard. Citing
Dalehite, the Court said that "The question is one of liability for
negligence at what this Court has characterized the 'operational
level' of governmental activity.' 7 The government conceded that
the "discretionary function" exception was not involved, but argued
that the provision imposing liability "in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . .."
must be read as excluding liability in the performance of activities
which private persons do not perform. Whereas in Dalelite the
Court was favorably disposed toward the governmental-proprietary
distinction, the Court in Indian Towing spoke of "the 'non-govern-
mental'-'governmental' quagmire" and said that "the decisions in
each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable
chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently un-
sound."'-8
The government argued that "there can be no recovery based on
175. The Court's statement that the Act did not create new cause,
of action where none existed before, even though the very purpose of the
Act was to make the government liable where it wvas not liable before. i%
reminiscent of a 1922 statement by Mr. Justice Holmes on behalf of the Court:
"The United States has not consented to be sued for torts, and therefore. it
cannot be said that in a legal sense the United States has been guilty of a
tort. For a tort is a tort in a legal sense only because the law has made it so."
The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 433 (1922).
176. Indian Towing Co. N. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955).
177. Id. at 64.
178. Id. at 65.
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the negligent performance of the activity itself, the so-called 'end-
objective' of the particular governmental activity,"' 7 but the Court
rejected the argument on the ground that some negligence would be
actionable and some not, without "a rational ground, one that would
carry conviction to minds not in the grip of technical obscurities."'"
The Court pointed out that the government's basis of differentiation
would be gone if private lighthouses were established and said that
"it is hard to think of any governmental activity on the 'operational
level,' our present concern, which is 'uniquely governmental,' in the
sense that its kind has not at one time or another been, or could not
conceivably be, privately performed."' 1 (How about the task of the
executioner?)
The Court held: "The Coast Guard need not undertake the light-
house service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light
... and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light.
it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was
kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extin-
guished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care
to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning that it
was not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and dani-
age was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable
under the Tort Claims Act." 18 2
The dissenting opinion adds the important fact, not mentioned
by the majority, that "navigators were warned this was an 'in-
watched light.' "183 Aside from emphasis on the departure from the
law declared in the Dalehite opinion, the main point of the dissent
was: "Liability of governments for the failure of lighthouse warn-
ing lights is as unknown to tort law as, for example, liability for
negligence in fire fighting excluded by the Dalehite ruling. Light-
house keeping is as uniquely a governmental function as fire
fighting."'18 4 The first sentence is true, but a statute often calls for a
result that has been unknown to the common law. The second
sentence is true, but the test of liability under the Act does not
depend upon what is governmental. Of the majority's holding, the
dissenters suggest: "Logically it may cover negligence in fire fight-
179. Id. at 66.
180. Ibid.
181. Id. at 68.
182. Id. at 69.
When the Coast Guard was negligent in attempting a rescue, the govern-
ment was held liable in United States v. Lawter, 219 F. 2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955).
183. 350 U. S. at 70. The opinion cites United States Coast Guard, Light
List, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts.
184. Id. at 75.
ol. 40:751
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
ing, although the Daleltite holding on that point is not overruled.
Perhaps liability arises even for injuries from negligence in pursu-
ing criminals. ' S5 Logically the holding does cover negligence in fire
fighting, and this may mean that Dalehite to that extent is overruled,
or at least severely limited. No good reason is apparent why the Act
should not be interpreted to impose liability for negligence of federal
officers in pursuing criminals.' 8
Ten guiding principles seem to emerge from a synthesis of the
Dalehite and Indian Towing cases. The principles are in some
measure uncertain because of lack of clarity in the Court's opinions,
and they are in some measure unreliable because the two cases are
inconsistent and because the Court divided four to three in one case
and five to four in the other. Assuming that the view taken in the
later Indian Towing case will endure and that that view prevails
to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Dalehite opinion, the
ten guiding principles are:
1. The government probably is not liable for negligence in
planning "at a planning rather than operational level.'1 8 7
2. The statutory concept of "a discretionary function," with
respect to which the government is not liable whether or not the
discretion involved be abused, probably is limited to the planning
level and probably does not include functions at the operational level
even if those functions involve discretion.18
185. Id. at 76.
186. In Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948). a
civilian who had been arrested by a military guard tried to escape and the
guard shot at him, hitting- an innocent bystander. The court held the govern-
ment liable.
Indeed, when an innocent party is shot in a gun battle between police and
fleeing bandits, the reasons for absolute liability of the governmental unit,
irrespective of negligence, are especially strong.
187. The words are quoted from the majority in Daleltite, 346 U. S. at
42. The dissenters in Dalehite did not disagree with the legal formulation.
The majority in Indian Towing, which included two of the three Dakehite
dissenters, said that the negligence was "at what this Court has characterized
the 'operational level' of governmental activity."
The statement of the principle implies that planning may be done at the
operational level, and this is intended. The lowest level of workmen. doing
only physicial work, may plan their work, but this does not mean that they
are at the planning level as the Court uses the term.
188. The government was liable for negligence of the Coast Guard in
the Indian Towing case. The negligence related to checking a battery and a
sun relay system, examining electrical connections, checking the light, and
failing to repair the light or give warning that it was not operating. These
functions may have involved discretion in the ordinary sense of the term, but
the holding based in this aspect on the government's concession makes clear
that they do not involve discretion in the sense in which the concept is used




3. The location of the line between the planning and opera-
tional levels is yet to be worked out, but the government is probably
immune from liability for negligence in "a plan developed at a high
level under a direct delegation of plan-making authority from the
apex of the Executive Department."'' 15
4. The line between the planning and operational levels may
depend not merely upon the position of the actor in the government
hierarchy but may depend in part on whether the negligence is "ini
policy decisions of a regulatory or governmental nature" or whether
the negligence relates to "actions akin to those of a private manu-
facturer, contractor, or shipper."'I9
5. "When an official exerts governmental authority in a man-
ner which legally binds one or many," the government probably is
not liable. 191
6. The test of government liability does not depend upon the
governmental-proprietary distinction. The government may be liable
Operating an airport control tower involves discretion at the operating
level. Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. 2(1 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
aff'd, 350 U. S. 907 (1955).
Even if at the planning level, pilots of a government plane are directed
to fly at the level of the highest known obstructions in the area, in order to
establish an instrument approach pattern for an airport, the government i*
liable if the pilots are negligent in flying one hundred feet above tile plain-
tiff's horses. Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F. 2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).
189. The words are quoted from Dalehite majority, 346 U. S. at 40. The.
disenterq in Dalehite did not disagree with the principle here stated but
asserted: " We cannot agree that all the way (lown the line there is immunity
for every balancing of care against cost, of safety against production, of
warning against silence." Id. at 58.
190. This principle is quite uncertain in the present stage of law de
velopment. The words are quoted from the dissenting opinion in Dah'hie.
346 U. S. at 60. The majority in Dalehite might well agree that the location
of the line depends in part upon this factor, although the quoted words might
be more carefully chosen to insure against slipping back into the govern-
mental-proprietary quagmire.
Another test proposed by the dissenters in Dalchite is not likely to win
future approval: "The exception clause of the Tort Claim,; Act protects the
public treasury where the common law would protect the purse of the acting
public official." 346 U. S. at 60. The public official's purse often must be
protected from liability in order that he may make determinations in the public
interest without being influenced by thoughts of protecting his purse: this ik
the reason why the federal courts have consistently held officers immune even
when their action is allegedly malicious. E.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d
579 (2d Cir. 1949). Furthermore, when an officer makes a reasonable isn-
take, the only way to avoid letting it rest on an innocent plaintiff or impos-
ing it on an innocent officer is to have the government bear it: the govern-
ment, after all, is the best of all possible loss spreaders.
That the government should ultimately bear a loss, and that a govern-
mient employee should not, even when the employee is negligent, was recog-
nized by a unanimous Court in United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 (1954)
191. The words are quoted from the Dalehite dissent, 346 U. S. at 59.
When justices arguing for liability acknowledge an area of nonliability, thejustices arguing for nonliability are likely to agree.
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for negligence at the operational level, even if the function per-
formed is governmental.1 2
7. Negligence in regulating or in failing to regulate through
resort to legislative power probably does not subject the government
to liability.193
8. Absolute liability without fault does not arise even if the
government handles an inherently dangerous commodity or engages
in an extra-hazardous activity. 04
9. The government may be liable for negligence in performing
a function even if the function has no counterpart in the activities oi
private persons. 9 '
10. The government may be liable for negligence in perform-
ing a service which neither the government nor the agency nor the
officers have an obligation to undertake. " '
§11. THE NEED FOR LIMITs ON LIABILITY OF
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
Clearly, governmental units should not be liable for all damage
caused to private parties by their action. Indeed, they often should
192. This principle is based upon the holding in the Indian Towing case,
but it is specifically opposed to unequivocal language of the Dalehite majority.
The Dalehite majority were Vinson, C. J., Reed, Burton, and Minton, JJ.
The Indian Towing dissenters were Reed, Burton, Minton, and Clark, JJ.,
and they asserted the same view of the governmental-proprietary distinction
that had been asserted by the majority in Dalehlite.
193. This is the holding of the majority in Dalehite with reopect to the
finding of negligence of the Coast Guard "in failing to prevent the fire by
regulating storage or loading of the fertilizer in some different fashion." 346
U. S. at 43. The dissenters did not specifically consider the point; the Indian
Towing case did not touch it.
194. The Court's holding to this effect in Dalehite is unchallenged and
seems solidly based on the statute.
Even so, something approaching absolute liability, or even something
equivalent to absolute liability, still may result in some cases. ,Most lawyers
know that the theory of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability
Act often works out in practice as something hard to distinguish from absolute
liability in many cases,
When a government airplane falls and injures the plaintiff, the govern-
ment may be liable even if no one knows the cause of the crash. The court
may resort to res ipsa loquitur, as in United States v. Kesinger. 190 F. 2d
529 (10th Cir. 1951). Where a plane was flying below a safe altitude and
crashed, no one knew why, the court found "a redressible wrong in the nature
of trespass." United States v. Gaidys, 194 F. 2d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 1952).
More spectacular is United States v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291 (4th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 934 (1954), where liability was imposed on the
government for the crash of a plane because South Carolina had enacted the
Uniform Aeronautics Act, which provides for absolute liability.
195. This is the specific holding in the Indian Towing case, for the Court
rejected the government's argument that the government is not liable in the
performance of activities which private persons do not perform.
196. In imposing liability in the Indian Towhig case, the Court recog-
nized that "The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse sermice." 350
U. S. at 69.
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be immune from liability even when their action is negligent, faulty,
mistaken, or based upon abuse of discretion.
The general realization of the truth of these propositions ex-
plains why both legislators and judges have so long resisted the
chorus of the commentators in favor of abolition of sovereign im-
munity. The gap between the uniform view advanced by the com-
mentators and the prevailing attitude of both legislators and judges
is a strikingly wide one. Something more than inertia accounts for it.
The commentators have gone all out for sovereign responsibility,
giving insufficient heed to problems of marking the outer limits of
liability. Judges and legislators have rightly sensed that govern-
mental units often should be immune from liability, even when their
officers or agents are at fault.
The plain fact is that if sovereign responsibility is to win legisla-
tive or judicial adoption, someone at some stage is going to have to
think through the exeremely difficult problems of what the limits
should be.
Judges and legislators are likely to continue to reject the exces-
sive proposition that governmental units should be liable in damages
whenever the fault of their officers or agents causes harm to private
parties. Some of them have learned of the French decision in the
Fleurette case.19 At the instance of the dairy industry, a statute was
enacted forbidding manufacture and sale of cream substitutes. A
manufacturer of cream substitutes, who was put out of business,
recovered damages from the French government.
Are we prepared in this country to go so far? The legislator or
the judge who has not given special study to the problem is likely
to reflect that nearly all legislation harms someone, and that a sys-
tem in which governmental units are liable in thousands or million,
of cases for each statute will be unworkable. Surely it is understand-
able that American judges and legislators hold back from headlong
adoption of the French system, especially when they are told, quite
inaccurately, that "The rule now generally applied by the Council
of State is that of absolute liability. The French State is responsible
in every case where damage has been caused by its acts.' ' . \\hat
197. La Fleurette, Sirey, 1938, 3, 25, Conseil d'E.tat.
Another such case is Caucheteaux et Desmont, Dall. Analytique, 194.1, I.
65, in which the Conseil d'Etat awarded damages to a sugar manufacturer
compelled to close down his plant on account of a statute reducing the pet
centage of sugar in beer in order to encourage cereal producers.
198. Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common-Law
World 302 (1954). The same writer softened the statement slightly later the
same year: "The French State is responsible in practically every case where
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they should be told is that even in France the government cannot
conceivably be liable for all damage done by its acts. The Fleurette
case is an extreme and limited one; the basic French law remains
that the government may legislate for the public welfare without
paying damages to those who are adversely affected.' 99
Responsible judges and legislators are fully aware of the utter
impracticability of trying to make governmental units liable in dam-
ages for all the harm they do to the interests of individuals and cor-
porations. A city should not be liable for damage done by a zoning
ordinance, which necessarily reduces the value of some property.
Nor should the state be liable to the seller of a harmful drug if it
enacts a statute prohibiting further sale of the drug, thereby destroy-
ing a profitable business. To make the federal government liable to
a public utility for the damage done by a rate reduction order would
be absurd.
But the usual proposal of American commentators is not that
governmental units should be absolutely liable; it is that liability
should be imposed for negligence or fault. Even this proposal is
clearly excessive. What a spectacle it would be if a court in a damage
suit were to receive evidence designed to prove that congressmen
were at fault in determining which way to vote on a bill! Or that the
President and his assistants were negligent in the manner in which
they considered an executive order!
A part of the problem here lies well beyond the relatively sim-
ple tort law about which the commentators are thinking. One aspect
damage has been caused by its acts." Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in
France, 29 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1432, 1454 (1954).
If the statement were true, nearly every act of government would give
rise to payment of thousands or millions of claims.
199. Both sides of the French law-immunity and liability-are yre-
sented by such writers as Street, Governmental Liability 56-80 (1953);
Jacoby, Federal Tort Claims Act and French Law of Govern mental Lia-
bility: A Comparative Study, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 246 (1954). Some of the
cases of nonliability of the French Government that Jacoby discusses include
statutory nonliability for war damages and for miscarriage of mail, and
judicially created nonliability for arbitrary arrest, death of third person in
police apprehension of criminals, error in declaring fit for military service a
man suffering from hernia, ordinary fault (as distinguished from grave fault
or "faute lourde") in collecting taxes or detaining goods for taxes.
On the problem of the Fleurette case, Jacoby says: "French law tradi-
tionally... has held that tort liability of the government cannot be predicated
upon a statute or regulation. In 1838 the Conseil d'Etat rejected a claim by a
tobacco manufacturer who vwas damaged by a law of 1835 establishing a
governmental tobacco monopoly. More recently [citing only the Fikurette
and the sugar-in-beer cases] damages were granted in some extreme cases,
on the priniciple of equality, where the enactment was silent on the question
of indemnity. But in most cases recovery is denied." For the last statement
two cases later than Fleurette are cited. 7 Vand. L. Rev. at 258.
See also the broad observation that "No recovery is granted for injuries
which affect, or are capable of affecting, everybody." Id. at 267.
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of the problem involves intricate issues about proper distribution of
governmental powers. Much of what is done by officers and em-
ployees of the government must remain beyond the range of judicial
inquiry, as it always has been. For instance, if the Secretary of State
miscalculates in getting too close to the brink of war, clearly we do
not want the courts in damage suits to determine whether the Secre-
tary was negligent in dealing with the problem of international rela-
tions. The government as an insurer, either with or without paymn(ent
of premiums, might properly distribute war losses to all taxpayers -
but surely not on the basis of a judicial finding of fault oil the part
of the government's officers.
Similarly, if the Federal Reserve Board is negligent in adjusting
interest rates, thereby causing excessive inflation or excessive defla-
tion, making the government liable to all who suffer husine. , loses
as a result would be out of the question.
If General X of the American Air Force negligently orders his
men to bomb the troops of General Y' of the American Army, and
Private Z is maimed, we don't want courts to inquire into the negli-
gence of General X in a suit by Z for damages, whether Z sues X
or sues the government. Z is no more entitled to tort damages than
his buddy who was hit by an enemy shell. The government should
take care of both through generous use of taxpayers' money. but
not through the medium of a damage suit in court.
In addition to necessary limitations upon control by courts of
other branches of the government through the mediun of suits for
damages, many other reasons call for limits on public liability. For
instance, should the government be liable for negligent failure of its
officers to enforce the antitrust law, or to issue a passport, or to
reduce a rate, or to apprehend a dangerous criminal? The problems
are numerous, complex, and difficult-some of them extraordinarily
difficult.
Even Professor Borchard. the leading advocate of governmient
responsibility, recognized the need for limits on liability for negli-
gence or fault in some kinds of governmental activity. On the first
page of the first of eight articles in his series on Governinent Liabil-
itly in Tort, he said: "Obviously the Administration cannot be held
to the obligation of guaranteeing the citizen against all errors or
defects, for life in an organized community requires a certain num-
ber of sacrifices and even risks. 200 In attacking the governmental-
200. Borchard. Governmental Liability in Tort. 34 Yale .. J. I 192-1)
For the series of eight article-. -ee 34 Yale L. J. 1. 129. 229 (1924-25 : 31, i,l.
1. 757. 1039 (1926-27) : 28 Colmm. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928).
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proprietary distinction, he acknowledged: "There are certain public
services which only the government can adequately perform, as for
example, the administration of justice, the preservation of public
peace and enforcement of the laws, and the protection of the com-
munity from fire and disease. It may hence be conceded that the
principle of immunity for the torts of officers engaged in 'govern-
mental' functions had some legitimate field of application."2-1
When Borchard finally drafted a proposed statute for state
liability in 1934202 and a proposed statute for municipal liability in
1942,203 he went very far-in all probability too far-in preserving
sovereign immunity. He proposed various exceptions from liability,
without explaining whether the exceptions were the product of
expediency from the standpoint of winning legislative approval or
whether they were the product of his own philosophical ideas of
what the limits of liability should be. The exceptions included in-
juries to the militia where workmen's compensation applied (but not
injuries to public employees subject to workmen's compensation),
injuries to prisoners, negligence of physicians and nurses in public
hospitals, specified willful torts and criminal acts, and "any claim
on account of the defect or alleged defect of any act of the govern-
ing body of the municipal corporation or of any administrative order
or regulation of any commission, department, board, institution,
agent or employee of the municipal corporation." Except for the
last provision, most of these exceptions seem unfortunate in some
respect. Perhaps tort liability for negligence should normally give
way to workmen's compensation when it is provided.20 ' No reason
is apparent why prisoners should not have as much right to damages
for tort as any other plaintiffs, as the New York courts have now
recognized..2 0 5 The negligence of physicians and nurses seems to be
as sound a basis for liability as the negligence of any other public
201. 34 Yale L. J. at 240. Borchard goes on to point out: "Not that such
a principle is necessarily inherent in government, for as will be seen here-
after, not a few governments in the world assume responsibility for the torts
of officers engaged in these functions."
202. Borchard, State and Munsicipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statu-
tory Reform, 20 A. B. A. J. 747, 793 (1934).
203. Borchard, Proposed State and Local Statutes Imposing Public
Liability in Tort, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 282, 298 (1942).
204. Cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), where one of
the grounds for nonliability of the government to injured soldiers was that
Congress has provided "systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation
for injuries or death of those in armed services."
205. Scarnato v. State, 298 N. Y. 376, 83 N. E. 2d 841 (1949) (prisoner
fell from ladder in prison yard; state liable for failing to provide belt or other
safeguard) ; Washington v. State, 277 App. Div. 1079, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 620(3d Dep't 1950) (state liable for negligence of fellow inmate of plaintiff,
under immediate supervision of guard).
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employees, as the New York courts have held.-"' No convincing
reason has even been given for excepting the willful torts or torts
which are criminal acts; since driving in excess of the speed limit
is a misdemeanor, hardly anyone will agree that "criminal acts"
ought to be excepted.
Borchard's proposal to continue the immunity for acts of the
governing board and for administrative orders and regulations has
much in common with the two clauses of §2680(a) of the Federal
Tort Claims Act,OT which retain immunity for (1) exercise of due
care in executing a statute or regulation even if the statute or regula-
tion is invalid and (2) performance or nonperformance of discre-
tionary functions even when discretion is abused.
Let us examine the merits of such exceptions as these.
§12. INVALIDITY OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION SHOULD NOT BE
A BASIS FOR LIABILITY
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the government is
not liable for "Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of
a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid."20
Invalidity of governmental action, without more, clearly should
not be a basis for liability for harm caused by the action.
When the National Industrial Recovery Act was held invalid in
1935, the number of people whose businesses had been directly
harmed by the Act and by the regulations issued under it probably
numbered in the millions. Large numbers, for instance, were fined
for selling goods below the minimum prices fixed; others complied
with the minimum price orders and lost customers to whom they
might have sold goods by cutting prices. Whether or not the general
public gained by the overall program is a question that perhaps no
one can answer. To make the government liable to any seller who
could prove in court that he could have made more profit if his busi-
ness had not been subjected to regulation would be obviously imi-
practical. Furthermore, the enactment of a statute or the adoption
206. Pope v. State, 283 App. Div. 853, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 224 (4th Decp't
1954), aff'd 308 N. Y. 813, 125 N. E. 2d 870 (1955) (liability for assault by
fellow inmate of state hospital) ; Ely v. State, 285 App. Div. 995, 139 N. Y. S.
2d 295 (4th Dep't 1955) (liability for suicide of inmate) ; Danna v. State, 207
Misc. 505, 139 N. Y. S. 2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (liability to inmate when gatc
and brick post in hospital fell) ; Dimitroff v. State, 171 Misc. 635, 13 N. Y. S
2d 458 (Ct. Cl. 1939) (liability for leaving inmate unattended).




of a regulation which a court later holds to be unconstitutional does
not necessarily, from a realistic standpoint, involve fault; the best
of lawyers and the best of judges, acting with the utmost of care,
can be wrong in their prediction of what the highest court will hold
on a constitutional issue. Invalidity is not the test of fault and it
should not be the test of liability.
Supposing the governing authority of a city adopts a zoning
ordinance which has the effect of reducing the value of land which
X holds for sale, and after X sells for the reduced price, a court
holds the zoning ordinance invalid. The fact of invalidity does not
necessarily mean that the governing authority was at fault in adopt-
ing the ordinance. Indeed, even if the court holds that the ordinance
is invalid for "abuse of discretion," the governing authority is not
necessarily at fault, for the concept of abuse of discretion is often
given a meaning other than the literal one. Even if the governing
authority is at fault, one may doubt that the city should be liable.
A regulatory agency orders a utility to reduce rates and the
utility complies while contesting the order. If a court holds the order
invalid, should the government be liable for damnages? The govern-
ment has harmed the utility by an invalid order, but that is hardly a
reason justifying governmental liability. Even if the utility should be
entitled to relief, the relief probably should be drawn from the rate-
payers, not from the taxpayers.
Another aspect of this exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
is more difficult. Should the government always be immune from
liability for what is prudently done in carrying out a statute or regu-
lation? If officers are authorized to take land for a flood-control or
irrigation project, clearly the government must be liable for the
taking. If officers are authorized to flood land, thereby in effect
destroying or taking it, the government must equally be liable. What
of damage resulting from authorized intermittent flooding, or inter-
mittent damage of some other sort? Even under the adjudicated
cases prior to the Tort Claims Act, the government is usually
liable.20 9 How much in principle does injury to persons differ from
injury to property? Might the present recognition of liability for
taking or destroying or damaging property be allowed to grow into
a more general liability for some types of harns specifically author-
ized by statute or by regulation? This is the course that French law
209. E.g., United States v% Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946) (government
planes flying low destroy value of chicken farm) ; United States v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co. 339 U. S. 799 (1950) (government liable for damage to




has taken. Opportunity for further movement of American law in
this area probably should not be cut off.
210
§13. THiE NEED FOR IMMUNITY FOR SOMIE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for government iu-
munity from liability for any claim "based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary func-
tion or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
Dean Stason has written that the Act "has shortcomings. It does
not apply to injuries caused in carrying out 'discretionary functions
•... If Dean Stason means that the government should be liable
for injuries caused in carrying out discretionary functions-and not
merely that the Act is too vague and susceptible to bad interpreta-
tion-then the reasons for disagreeing with him and for agreeing
with Congress seem overwhelming.
Courts are not the only authority of government with coi-
petence to make final determinations of government policies and
government action. Sometimes decisions made in the legislative or
executive branches of the government should be beyond the area of
judicial review. If an oil company wants to prove in a damages
action against the government that the State Department va negli-
gent in failing sufficiently to press its claim for compensation for a
foreign government's expropriation of its oil property, the court
probably should refuse to consider the evidence. If the lFederal
210. That § 2680(a) cuts off liability under the Tort Claim- .\et de,.
not necessarily mean that the government is not otherwise liable. In Bulloch
v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955) suit was brotght by
sheep owners under the Tort Claims Act for damage to herds by nuclear test-
at the Nevada proving ground. The allegation was made that the tets were
'negligently performed." Surely the government should be liable %betber or
not negligence is proved. If the tests were to continue indefinitely, they might
be brought within the principle of United States v. Causby, 328 L'. S. 256
(1946).
211. Stason, Govcrnnental Tort Liability Symposium, 29 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 1321, 1322 (1954).
Compare James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers.
22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 655 (1955). Of the Tort Claims Act's exception of "a
discretionary function," Professor James says with reference to the Dah'hit'
interpretation: "Since the millstone of this interpretation is now huiig around
its neck, and since it is not needed for the only purpose it should serve, this
provision should be repealed." Perhaps the only sense in which the e,"ception
for "a discretionary function" is not needed is in the sense that nothing
more is needed than an enactment that the government shall be liable ill
accordance with principles to be worked out by the courts. If Congress is to
participate to the extent of marking out broad guides for adjudication, thei,
some such exception as this one is needed.
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Reserve Board restricts or expands credit by adjusting interest
rates, thereby causing inflation or deflation and injuring the plain-
tiff, a court probably should refuse to inquire whether the Board
was negligent or mistaken in making its calculations.
We must avoid the fallacy of Miller v. Horton.212 The Massa-
chusetts court succumbed to that fallacy when it assumed that the
horse did not have glanders because the jury so found, even though
the members of the board of health who destroyed the horse and
who may have been better qualified than the jury found that the
horse did have glanders. The second guess of a court in a damages
suit is about as likely to be wrong in an absolute sense as the first
guess of the Federal Reserve Board in adjusting interest rates or
of the President and State Department in conducting foreign rela-
tions. Much business of governmental units is beyond the com-
petence of courts.
If abuse of discretion is found to be the basis of a rate reduction
order, of a license revocation, of a cease and desist order, or of a
denial of a zoning permit, the party injured by the abuse of discre-
tion probably should not have a cause of action for damages against
the governmental unit, even if the court is well qualified to make the
determination. True, because the governmental unit's fault has in
each instance harmed the plaintiff, perhaps an ideal system of justice
in Utopia would compensate for every harm resulting from gov-
ernmental fault. But in the practical world the machinery necessary
to compute the damages and provide relief in all such cases might
be too extensive, and losses of this type are in the long run normally
rather well distributed over all who are subject to regulation. Prob-
ably for these reasons harms of this kind have to be regarded as one
of the necessary costs of living in organized society.
Whether or not the Dalehite decision was sound. the Supreme
Court may have been moving in the right direction in that part of
the opinion which recognized a distinction between the planning
level and the operational level..2 13 When the President or a cabinet
officer, pursuant to a proper delegation, decides that justice or uis-
dom calls for a particular course of action, a court may well be
bound by the determination in the same way that it is bound by
legislation. The court thus may properly refrain from inquiring
212. 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891).
213. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 42 (1953): "In short, the
alleged 'negligence' does not subject the Government to liability. The de-
cisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than
operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the
practicability of the Government's fertilizer program."
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whether the action was negligent, for even if the court deems itself
competent to inquire, the power may be committed to the officer to
act unwisely or mistakenly or even negligently. Furthermore, the
consequences of the type of action taken may be adequately spread
among those affected. But if a janitor or truck driver or clerk acts
negligently and hurts the plaintiff, the court is in no sense bound by
the determination made by the public employee. The location of
the precise line here seems to call for the method of case-to-case
adjudication.2 14
Perhaps the line is not between those who plan and those who
operate (for all do some planning), nor between those who exercise
discretion and those who do not (for all do), nor between high-
salaried and low-salaried employees (for the government should be
liable for negligence of a cabinet officer driving a government car on
government business), nor between manual and mental workers, nor
between those who affect economic interests and those who affect
physical results. The line must be located on the basis of a judgment
about the propriety of making adjustments through the medium of
damage suits. The difference between the planning and the opera-
tional levels may be one of the criteria, but it is only one.
In the exercise of some types of discretionary functions, then,
governmental units clearly should be immune from liability for
damages on account of negligence, fault, mistakes, or abuse of dis-
cretion. This is not the same as saying that all applications that have
been made of the "discretionary function" exception to the Tort
Claims Act are sound. But some such exception is needed, and the
provision of the Act is probably susceptible of interpretation to make
it thoroughly sound.
§14. NONFEASANCE
Some of the problems of governmental nonfeasance are most
intriguing. Even under the Tort Claims Act the government was
214. Compare Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale I.. J.
129, 135 (1924) : "The distinction as a basis for liability, between (1) deter-
mining whether an act shall be done and (2) then acting upon and executing
the determination, has justification only to the extent that deliberation and
action as to policy is legislation and hardly an operative fact imposing legal
duties, and for the exertion of power in determining policies it would there-
fore be inappropriate to predicate tort liability. On the other hand, to in-
pose tort responsibility in connection with acts performed in execution of
legislation would, if uniformly applied, do away with most of the alleged dis-
tinctions between governmental and corporate functions and would make
the city responsible whenever there was a breach of legal duty running
to the injured individual. This perhaps is the soundest basis for predicating
legal responsibility and would render irrelevant a distinction between acts
of omission and commission. .. "
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liable in the Indian Towing case21 for failure to check and repair
the lighthouse equipment, despite the lack of obligation to provide
a lighthouse service. The principle involved is broad enough to
impose liability for negligence in failing to replace a stop sign, -10
failing to keep traffic lights working properly,21- and marking dan-
gerous curves on highways with warning signs but failing to mark
one.2 s Perhaps, as New York courts have held, the state should be
liable for negligence in failing to prevent one inmate from assaulting
another in a mental hospital,"1 9 failing to prevent a suicide of an
inmate,2 20 failing to prevent the escape of a dangerous person,2'
failing to furnish a belt to a prisoner who worked on a ladder in a
prison yard,222 and failure of an instructor in a state school to in-
struct a student before the student did a headstand. -2 2 3
At the other end of the scale, perhaps, as courts have held, gov-
ernmental units should not be liable for failing to maintain water
pressure sufficient to prevent a fire and for failing to create a fire
department, -2 2 4 failing to revoke the license of a driver who later
caused an accident, 225 failure of police officers to prevent harm from
215. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955).
216. Liability was imposed for failure to replace a stop sign in Gure-
vitch v. State, 285 App. Div. 863, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 702 (4th Dep't 1955), re-
versing Gurevitch v. State, 205 Misc. 487, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 749 (Ct. CI. 1954).
217. Liability was imposed in Cleveland v. Town of Lancaster, 239 Ap.
Div. 263, 267 N. Y. S. 673 (4th Dep't ), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 568, 191 N. E. 568
(1934), and in other New York cases.
218. A dismissal of a complaint was reversed in Rugg v. State, 284
App. Div. 179, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 2 (3d Dep't 1954), where the claim was based
upon negligence of the state "in failing to provide the travelling public ade-
quate warning of the dangerous condition that existed on this curve and the
approach to the narrow bridge."
219. Scolavino v. State, 187 Misc. 253, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 17 (Ct. CL.),
award inicreased 271 App. Div. 618, 67 N. Y. S. 2d -02 (3d Dep't 1946), aff'd,
297 N. Y. 460, 74 N. F_. 2d 174 (1947).
The federal government is held not liable in such a case because the claim
arises "out of" assault and battery within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §
2680(h). Wilcox v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
220. Dow v. State, 183 Misc. 674, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 342 (Ct. CI. 1944).
221. Jones v. State, 267 App. Div. 254, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 404 (3d Dep't
1943). The court said: "While the State is not an insurer of the public, it is
nevertheless called upon to protect the community from the acts of insane
persons under its care." Id. at 257, 45 N. Y. S. 2d at 406.
222. Scarnato v. State, 272 App. Div. 1085, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 535 (3d Dep't
1947), affd, 298 N. Y. 376, 83 N. E. 2d 841 (1949). The amount of danmages
awarded the prisoner was $50,000.
Contrast the line of federal cases holding, without specific support in
the Tort Claims Act, that the government is not liable in tort to federal
prisoners. Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953) ; Van
Such v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. N.Y. 1954).
223. Gardner v. State, 256 App. Div. 385, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 274 (3d Dep't).
aff'd, 281 N. Y. 212, 22 N. E. 2d 344 (1939).
224. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N. Y. 51, 64 N. E. 2d 704 (1945).
225. Chikofsky v. State, 203 Misc. 646, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 264 (Ct. CI.
1952).
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a crowd in panic, "--" failure to regulate, 22 7 or failure to repeal an
ordinance .2 2 Presumably a governmental unit would not be liable
for negligent delay in issuing a passport or approving an increase in
rates or granting a license.
The provocative problem case is whether the governmental unit
should be liable for an omission with respect to a responsibility
which it has to some uncertain extent assumed. A health officer
negligently fails to establish a quarantine. A city council or a sub-
ordinate officer is careless in failing to establish a stop sign or a
traffic light. A public inspector or examiner negligently fails to
detect a dangerous condition in an elevator2 29 or bank23 1 or loco-
motive or building. A city assigns too few policemen to patrol an
area where automobiles are allowed to race on a public highway.21
Police are tipped off that X's life may be threatened but they fail to
provide adequate protection and X's enemies kill or injure him.-",'
A New York court's generalization that "waiver of sovereign
immunity ... does not create liability ol the part of a City for failure
to exercise a governmental function ' 231 is unsatisfactory, for even
apart from uncertainty about the meaning of "governmental func-
tion" the city should be liable for failure to exercise governmental
functions for which it has assumed the responsibility. For instance.
the only obligation a state has for building highways and erecting
traffic signs is a self-imposed obligation, but once the obligation is
assumed the state should be liable for its negligent acts or omissions.
\Vhen the state assumes the responsibility for marking dangerous
226. Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 750
(Ist Dep't), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 845, 72 N. E. 2d 29 (1946).
227. Doughty v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 321 Pa. 136, 184 AtI. 93
(1936) (failure to prevent trolley from running wrong way on one-way
street).
228. Shipley v. Arroyo Grande, 92 Cal. App. 2d 748, 208 P. 2d 51 (1949)
(ordinance permitted diagonal parking).
229. The state was held not liable for inadequate inspection of elcvator-
in Chastaine v. State, 160 Misc. 828, 290 N. Y. S. 789 (Ct. Cl. 1936).
230. Before the full New York waiver of liability, the state was held
not liable for loss to depositors even assuming negligence of the bank ex-
aminers. Sherlock v. State, 198 App. Div. 494, 191 N. Y. S. 412 (3d Dep't
1921).
231. Liability was imposed in Saari v. State, 282 App. Div. 526, 125
N. Y. S. 2d 507 (3d Dep't 1953), where the duty to patrol was imposed by
statute.
232. S identified a man wanted for bank robbery. Shortly thereafter S
was shot and killed by persons unknown. S's son alleged that police failed
to furnish S with proper protection and lulled him into a sense of security by
telling him he had little to fear. The city was held not liable. Schuster v. City
of New York, 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 286
App. Div. 389, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 778 (2d Dep't 1955).
233. Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 377. 59 N. Y. S 2d
750, 754 (1st Dep't), aff'd 296 N. Y. 845, 72 N. E. 2d 29 (1946).
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curves on highways, drivers know of and rely upon that responsi-
bility. Therefore, the state should be liable when it fails to mark a
dangerous curve, and a New York case so holds..2 3 4
A curious but practical problem is whether a governmental aul-
thority may assume only a part of the responsibility for protecting
the public. The government may say, in effect: "We will have our
ICC inspectors order out of service the locomotives they find unsafe,
but we don't assume the responsibility for finding all the deficiencies
that careful inspection would disclose." The city may say, in effect:
"Our health inspector will impose a quarantine when an epidemic
comes to his attention but not otherwise." Should such limitations
on undertakings of public authorities mean immunity for omissions
that might not have occurred if the program at the outset were
intended to be more comprehensive? This question probably must
be broken down into many parts before satisfactory answers may
be discovered. The government in the Indian Towing case 2 3 listed
the lighthouse as "unwatched" but was held liable for failure ade-
quately to watch it. Yet the government's undertaking to inspect
food under the Food and Drug Act is obviously only a partial one,
and perhaps the government should not be liable for negligent failure
of an inspector to detect food that may cause harm. Similarly, the
government can hardly be held liable for failure of the Weather
Bureau to give warning of an impending flood.230
A most provocative case is Runkel v. City of New York.2-1- A
city building inspector examined an abandoned dwelling, found that
it was in imminent danger of collapse, and recommended to the
owners that it be made secure or demolished at once. The following
day the superintendent of buildings made a formal finding and
posted a notice to the owner requiring immediate repair or demoli-
tion. Thereafter neither the city nor the owners took further action.
Fifty days after the inspection, the building collapsed and hurt the
plaintiff's children. The action was brought against the owners and
the city. A divided Appellate Division held that it was error to dis-
234. Rugg v. State, 284 App. Div. 179, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 2 (3d Dcp't
1954).
235. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955).
236. In National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263 (8th Cir.).
cert. denied, 347 U. S. 967 (1954), suit was brought under the Tort Claims Act
for the Weather Bureau's negligent assurance to plaintiff that the river would
not overflow, and for negligent failure to give warning of the impending over-
flow. The court held the government immune under 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a).
237. 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N. Y. S. 2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953). The court
later held that the owners were primarily liable and therefore that the city
was entitled to recover against the owners. Runkel v. Homelsky, 286 App.
Div. 1101, 145 N. Y. S. 2d 729 (2d Dep't 1955).
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miss the complaint. The court asserted that "the surrender of sover-
eign immunity from liability with respect to a governmental func-
tion, is not limited to any act of misfeasance or nonfeasance-com-
mission or omission. The surrender is broad, general and unquali-
fied."238 The court stated the test of liability: "Vhether . ..an
individual or private corporation would be liable for the breach if
the governmental duty were imposed upon him or it. ' '2 ' 9 The owners
had the duty and the owners were liable: therefore the city was
liable.
Is the Runkel decision sound? Should its doctrine be limited to
cases in which the governmental unit is at fault after a specific dan-
gerous condition becomes known to its agents ? Is the court's opinion
sound in asserting that the test of liability is whether a private party
would be liable for the breach if the governmental duty were in-
posed upon the private party? If so, a governmental unit will hc
liable when its inspector negligently fails to discover the tlangerot,.
condition of a bank or an elevator or an airplane.
§15. LAW MAKING AS TIE TEs-T
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for four dissenting Justices in the
Dalehite case, thoughtfully suggested a creative interpretation of the
"discretionary function" exception to the Tort Claims Act:
"We think that the statutory language. the reliable legislative
history, and the common-sense basis of the rule regarding muni-
cipalities, all point to a useful and proper distinction l)reserved
by the statute other than that urged by the Government. When
an official exerts governmental authority in a manner which
legally binds one or many, lie is acting in a way in which no
private person could. Such activities do and are designed to
affect, often deleteriously, the affairs of individuals, but courts
have long recognized the public policy that such official shall be
controlled solely by the statutory or administrative mandate and
not by the added threat of private damage suits." '
Borchard proposed that governmental units should be immune
from liability for legislative enactments, executive orders, acts of
governing bodies of municipal corporations, and orders and regula-
tions of administrative officers and employees.
2 1 1
The idea that law making should be the test of immunity or
liability is an interesting one and may turn out to be useful if it is
238. 282 App. Div. at 178, 123 N. Y. S. 2d at 490-91.
239. Id. at 178, 123 N. Y. S. 2d at 491.
240. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 59 (1953).
241. Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort- Proposed Nh it-
tory Reform. 20 A. B. A. J. 747, 793 (1934).
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properly qualified. But one may say with full confidence that the
government should not be immune from liability for flooded land
merely because the height of a dam is fixed by law. Whenever prop-
erty is taken, the governmental unit should be liable even if the
taking is done by the legislative body in enacting legislation, and the
concept of taking should be at least broad enough, as the Supreme
Court has held, to encompass low fights of government planes which
destroy the value of a chicken farm.2 4 2 If an operator of an airport
control tower negligently gives an order which causes two planes to
collide, liability or immunity of the governmental unit for which
the operator works probably ought not to depend upon whether or
not violation of the order is a misdemeanor or whether the order
otherwise has or does not have force of law. Similarly, if the ICC's
negligence in rerouting trains around a flood causes an accident, or
if the negligence of a chemist of the Department of Agriculture pro-
duces the wrong formula for poisonous spray required by regulation
to be used on certain fruit, or if an engineer of the CAB is negligent
in preparing a regulation prescribing specifications for aircraft con-
struction, perhaps government liability or immunity should not
depend upon the question whether the act in each instance is deemed
to involve law making. In the Dalehite case,21 3 prescribing the PRP
coating (paraffin, rosin, and petrolatum) made the fertilizer more
dangerous as an explosive, and yet government liability or immunity
from liability ought not to depend upon whether the prescription
happened to be by letter from a government officer to the private
manufacturer or happened to be by regulation or order.2 '"
The suggested test may be questionable not only in leading to
immunity when the government probably ought to be liable, but it
may sometimes call for liability when the government ought to be
immune. If probable cause exists for having X arrested and in-
dicted, but if the United States attorney's negligence is the only
reason for his failure to discover evidence proving X's innocence,
the government probably should not be liable to X even though the
United States attorney was not making law. If a superior officer
negligently fails to recognize the merit of the work of a subordinate
and gives him a lower efficiency rating than he deserves, the govern-
ment probably ought not to be liable, even though the superior is
not making law.
242. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946).
243. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953).
244. Yet the Court held in the Daclhite case that because the Coast
Guard and other agencies regulated storage or loading of the fertilizer through
regulations, the government was not liable. Id. at 43.
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Even z-o, law making may often be a good test of liability or
immunity, for a court frequently should refrain from overriding a
law-making authority of the government which makes a determina-
tion that wisdom or justice requires a particular course of action or
adjustment, but a court may often award damages for negligent
harm caused by an officer or employee who is not engaged in law
making.
§16. JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL ACrION,
Negligence or fault of judges probably ought not to be the basis
for tort liability of a governmental unit for two reasons: (1) We
should not try each case twice, once between the parties and onc
between the losing party and the governmental unit. (2) For rather
strong policy reasons, we do not want the shortcomings of judges
to be the subject of litigation. Abstractly, awarding damages when
a party is hurt by a serious fault of a judge would be justice, but
practically that cannot be done without incurring all the disadvant-
ages of allowing parties who are disgruntled by adverse decisions
to make unwarranted charges against careful and conscientious
judges,
But what of corrupt or malicious judicial action? Our system is
clear-and probably wise-that suits against judges themselves
must be forbidden if we are to avoid impairment of the judicial
function.2 15 Judge Learned Hand has declared of prosecuting of-
ficers :
"It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for
any other personal motive not connected with the public good.
should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and,
if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the
guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification
for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim
is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit
all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a
trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible.
in the unflinching discharge of their duties."""
How far are these remarks valid if the suit is against the gov
ernmental unit instead of against the judge or the officer? The (lues-
tion is by no means an easy one.
245. E.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). lit ri
Koeppe v. City of Hudson. 276 App. Div. 443, 445-46, 95 N. Y. S 2d 700.
703 (3d Dep't 1950): "Judicial officers may be personally liable in oine
instances for acts beyond the scope of their jurisdiction." The casc holds that
the city is not liable for the acts of the judge.
246. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Even when judges and juries are guilty of nothing more serious
than good faith mistakes, we do often hold the governmental unit
liable for wrongful conviction of criminal defendants. For instance,
a federal statute-47 provides for payment of damages to one who is
proved innocent after serving in a penitentiary, although the statute
fixes an unreasonably low maximum of $5,000. Can we-and should
we-find a way to correct other injustice stemming from proved
miscarriage of the judicial process?
If one is arrested, accused, tried, convicted, and finally released
by an appellate court on some grounds such as that the offense
charged is not a crime under the applicable statute, the govern-
mental unit has inflicted harm .upon the accused person, and the
system is designed for the protection of the public. Should the public
pay for the harm done? Of course, our law clearly answers the ques-
tion no, but as we become more accustomed to a system of sover-
eign responsibility, the question may become a live one. In one
aspect the problem is whether it is practicable to try to compensate
for such relatively small harms that are an inevitable product of any
system of administering justice. A possible answer is that damages
should be awarded only when either the loss is exceptional, as when
an innocent person serves a penitentiary sentence, or when sub-
ordinate officers are at fault so that the governmental unit will be
liable under the usual principles applying to false arrest and to false
imprisonment. New York courts already have moved far into this
area. The state has been held liable for an arrest and detention on a
health officer's certificate which failed to show that the health officer
had personally examined the arrested person.2 48 When state troop-
ers complied with a father's request to pick up an eighteen-year-old
girl who had left home without permission, the state was held liable
for detaining her in jail overnight .24 9 When officers thought that one
who was dazed by an accident was intoxicated, damages against the
state in the amount of $3,500 were awarded for keeping the driver
in jail overnight without medical attention. - "
An especially significant case is White v. State.2 ' While on
parole from Sing Sing, White stole an automobile in New Jersey,
247. 28 U. S. C. § 2513 (1952). The plaintiff must show that his con-
viction has been set aside on the ground that he is not guilty, or that he
has been pardoned on the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction.
and that he did not by misconduct or negligence bring about his prosecution.
248. Warner v. State, 297 N. Y. 395, 79 N. E. 2d 459 (1948).
249. Bonnau v. State, 278 App. Div. 181, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (4th
Dep't), af'd, 303 N. Y. 721, 103 N. E. 2d 340 (1951).
250. Tierney v. State, 266 App. Div. 434, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 877 (3d Dep't
1943). aff'd, 292 N. Y. 523, 54 N. E. 2d 207 (1944).
251. 199 Misc. 728, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
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for which he was there subsequently convicted and imprisoned. The
New York parole authorities kept him imprisoned beyond the ex-
piration date of his original sentence, under a statute authorizing
such action when a felony is committed in another state. In an
action against the state for damages, White satisfied the Court of
Claims that stealing a motor vehicle was only a high misdemeanor
in New Jersey, not a felony. The court held that the error of law
of the parole authorities was a ground for liability: "Claimant hav-
ing been illegally detained for a period approximating ten months
beyond his maximum sentence, he is awarded the sum of $4,500 for
his unlawful imprisonment and loss of earnings. ' ' 5- ' The case could
conceivably be the forerunner of developing law imposing liability




Like judicial decisions, determinations in administrative ad-
jtudications ordinarily do not give rise to liability of the govern-
mental unit, even when negligence or other fault is proved. Even
though the statutory words waiving immunity are unqualified, a
New York court has held that the state is not liable for wrongful
suspension of a liquor license. ' A federal court has held a city
immune from liability for a building inspector's alleged negligence
and fraud in delaying the issuance of a building permit,'-""' and a
state court holds a city immune where it condemned an tmncom-
pleted apartment building and then reftsed to give the owner a
building permit or sufficient time to make repairs.-'-'" But when a
loss is exceptional and when the degree of injustice seems large.
might not some future tribunal rely upon the While case"-"-- as a
precedent and impose liability?
252. Id. at 731, 101 N. Y. S. 2d at 706.
253. A French statute of 1895 provided that an appeal coutr etting
aside a criminal conviction may grant damages against the state for the
x\rongful conviction. A leading French philosopher, l)uguit, %%onld impot.
liability on the state whenever it can be done without impairing te dicrine of
res judicata. See Street, Governmental Liability 69-70 (1953).
254. Toyos v. State, 181 Misc. 761, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 322 (Ct. ('1. 1944) It,
Beaudrias v. State, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 509 (Ct. Cl. 1944). action of a ,ate legal
otticer in handling litigation was regarded as quasi-judicial. and thelefore
the state x\as not liable in tort for dilatory and obstructive actii.
In Matveychuk v. United States. 195 F. 2d 613 (2d Cir.), ic I,. d, nii'd.
344 U. S. 845 (1952), the "discretionary" exception of the Tort (laim., Act
wa, invoked to hold the government immune froin liability fir denyi.ng
permission to the plaintiff to increase a rent.
See Annot., 37 A. L. R. 2d 694 (1954), collecting caes on mnnicipal
immunity from liability in damages for refusal to grant permit. licVV,.
or franchises.
255. Carr v. City of Anchorage, 114 F. Supp. 439 (I). .\lak a 1953)
256. Akin v. City of Miami, .. Fla. ... 65 So. 2d 54 (1953).
257. White v. State. 199 Misc. 728. 101 N. Y. S. 2d 702 (Ct. CI 195(1
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§17. SOME MUSINGS ABOUT LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES
The development of a full-fledged system of sovereign respon-
sibility is a task of enormous difficulty and is not likely to be
accomplished without the interaction of many minds over long
periods. We shall nevertheless now open up a few questions, make
some guesses, and express some subjective opinions.
As we have seen, governmental units cannot feasibly be made
liable for all the harms that are caused by their negligence or fault. -'
Something in the nature of the "discretionary function" exception
to the Tort Claims Act is essential. The test ought to be neither the
invalidity of the governmental action, nor the governmental-pro-
prietary distinction, nor the difference between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, nor the line between law making and action which does
not involve law making, nor the difference between judicial and
nonjudicial action, nor the liability or nonliability of the officer or
employee whose act or omission causes the harm.'5
What, then, should be the test?
The conventional answer has been that a governmental unit
should be liable whenever a private party would be liable in the same
circumstances. This answer may be sound as far as it goes, -' 0 but it
does not go far enough to reach the most difficult problems. A large
portion of the functions of governmental units have no private
counterpart. Private parties do not draft men, administer prisons,
conduct international relations on behalf of a general public, zone
other people's property, enact statutes or ordinances, adjudicate
cases, issue administrative orders or regulations that may have force
of law, regulate economic life, or authoritatively determine policies
that may be binding upon courts.
The task ahead that is easy to plan is to make governmental units
liable in tort whenever a private party vould be liable in the same
circumstances. The task ahead that is especially difficult is to work
out a satisfactory system of liability and immunity with respect to
functions that have no private counterpart.
We still fall considerably short of accomplishing the first of these
objectives. New York seems to be soundly on the road to a full
258. If Congress, or the President, or an agency is at fault in making
a choice of policy, millions may be directly hurt, but a correction through
damage suits may be clearly inappropriate.
.259. Each of these possible tests is discussed in the foregoing pages.
260. The test becomes misleading if one reasons as did Mr. Justice Reed
on behalf of the four dissenting Justices in the Indian Towing case when he
assumed that the government must be immune from liability for any action
having no private counterpart. Indian Towing Co. v. United States. 350 U. S.
61, 70 (1955).
For action having no private counterpart, the government should some-
times be liable and sometimes immune.
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accomplishment of it. Legislation is needed in nearly all the other
states. The Federal Tort Claims Act needs to be patched up in
several respects. The limitation of liability to "negligent or wrong-
ful" acts or omissions should be corrected. When an ammunition
dump explodes, the government should be liable for all resulting
damage, irrespective of negligence, just as a private corporation
would be. When a military plane falls on a house, the government
should be liable whether or not negligence can be proved.'2' When
a government employee is authorized to use a government vehicle,
the government should be liable for the negligence of the employee,
even if the employee is beyond the scope of his employment..2 12 Con-
gress through private laws has already largely recognized the need
for absolute liability in cases like these.-"" The Act should be
amended to make the government liable for willful torts. No longer
should the government be immune from liability for such a tort as
false imprisonment, as it was in the case in which one who had been
honorably discharged from tle Army was imprisoned by tile Army
for desertion.
2 6
To make all federal, state, and local governmental units liable
for their torts to the same extent that private parties are liable in
similar circumstances will be a significant accomplishment. Even so,
in the long run the demands of justice will compel us to go much
further. We shall have to work out principles to govern liability
with respect to those activities which are uniquely governmental.
On this problem a good deal of thinking is needed. Messrs. Gell-
horn and Schenck, recognizing the intricacy of the problem, have
proposed: "The old Illinois statute, authorizing the hearing of 'all
claims . . .which the State, as a sovereign commonwealth, should,
in equity and good conscience, discharge and pay,' might furnish a
sound basis for future federal legislation. It would, we think, be
feasible and constructive to subject the Federal Government to
liability wherever 'in equity and good conscience' payment should
be made."' 65 Such a statute would merely pass the buck to the
261. The government was held liable in United States v. Praylou, 208 F.
2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 934 (1954). but the deeisioll
rested upon a South Carolina statute making the liability absolute.
In Williams v. United States, 218 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955), thie govern-
ment was held not liable when a jet bomber exploded in the air and the
plaintiffs were hurt when flaming fuel fell.
262. A private employer would be liable in about ten states. But liablilit%
insurance commonly covers such a case, so that the injured party is protectel
when the employer is insured. See § 8, above.
263. See § 2, above.
264. Duenges v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.I). N.Y. 1953).




courts. Possibly that is what is needed, for the problem is surely
difficult enough to require the development of law through case-to-
case adjudication. The trouble is, however, that the whole doctrine
of sovereign immunity is judge-made, and that the courts have often
clung to the immunity even when legislative bodies have asserted
that they want sovereign responsibility. Basic planning, if it is to be
sound and effective, must take into account the judicial attitude
that is exemplified by the holding that a city is not liable for defec-
tive fire-fighting equipment even though the city officials knew of
the defects and even though a statute provided for liability for in-
juries resulting from defects in equipment where the officials have
knowledge of the defects.2 6 Let us not forget that most of the state
statutes consenting to suits against the state have been construed to
waive immunity from suit but not immunity from liability. G8 Let us
not forget that as recently as 1955 four Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States were still insisting that the Tort Claims
Act should be interpreted to retain immunity with respect to all
"governmental" functions. 68 Even the New York courts, which
have been outstanding in the nation in catching the spirit of sover-
eign responsibility, have had to be prodded by further legislation at
several stages of the overall development..2 69
The time will come when we shall perceive more clearly that
governmental units should often be liable where private parties
would not be and should not be liable. After all, a governmental unit
differs significantly from a private party: it is supported by taxa-
tion, and it is not dependent upon private investment or private
profit. A large enough governmental unit is the best of all possible
loss spreaders, especially, perhaps, if its taxes are geared to ability
to pay. This basic fact, which so far has been given too little heed,
will in time lead us to see that the basis for government liability
should not be fault but should be equitable loss spreading. The ulti-
mate principle may be that the taxpaying public should usually bear
the fortuitous and heavy losses that result from governmental activ-
ity. The key idea will be neither comparison with private liability
in the same circumstances, nor the extra-hazardous character of the
activity, nor authorized use of a government vehicle or other such
instrumentality, nor fault on the part of the governmental unit or its
agents; the key idea will be simply that a beneficent governmental
266. Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P. 2d 980 (1952).
267. See the whole discussion in § 6, above.
268. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 70 (1955).
269. For instance, compare Goldstein v. State, 281 N. Y. 396. 24 N. E.
2d 97 (1939), with N. Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8-a, added by L. 1953, c. 343.
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unit ought not to allow exceptional losses to be borne by those upon
whom the governmental activity has happened to inflict them.
A sample of the attitude which may become the law of tile future
is the assumption by the British government of liability for all dam-
age done by German bombs during the Second World War, as well
as the somewhat similar statute enacted by the United States Con-
gress. - 0
The basic principle for which we are searching may turn out to
have a good deal in common with the present principle concerning
governmental liability in eminent domain cases: just as the govern-
ment has to pay for the property it deliberately takes, it should have
to pay for the deliberate choices it makes to engage in activities
which it knows in advance are sure to cause exceptional losses to
private parties. The basic principle may turn out to resemble the
government's liability to its own employees under worknen's com-
pensation legislation: if government activities cause human wear
and tear on government employees, the cost of which should be
borne by the taxpaying public, then when government activities
cause exceptional loss to those who are not government employees.
the cost similarly should be borne by the taxpaying public. Even the
law with respect to liability of private enterprises is tending to move
away from a fault basis and toward the principle that the enterprise
should bear the losses it causes. The law with respect to liability of
public enterprises may soundly, perhaps, go even further in the
same direction.
Of course, this is far from saying that governmental units should
be liable for all private losses they cause. Most such losses, as now.
will have to be regarded as a part of the necessary price for the bene-
fits of living in organized society. Nearly all policy determination
legislative, executive, judicial. or administrative-hurts someoe.
The losses caused by policy choices are usually well spread, and even
when the
, 
are not, as when a statute destroys a profitable busiis.,
by prohibiting sale of a product deemed harmful, the governmental
unit probably should usually be immune from liability. Many losses.
as now. will have to he borne by those upon whom they fall even
when the governmental unit is at fault in causing the loss: for in-
stance, those whose property is reduced in value by a zoning ordi-
nance probably should not have a cause of action against the city.
even if a court finally holds that the adoption of the ordinance wa,
270. 56 Stat. 174 (1942). repealed by 61 Stat. 209 (1947). a;1:Itlllcd
government liability for war damage theretofore caused and provided fot
payment of premiums for government insurance againmt later war damnige
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an abuse of discretion. Yet governmental units should often be
liable for exceptional losses that are not otherwise sufficiently spread
and that equitably should be spread through the medium of damage
suits.
One may hope that future articles in legal periodicals will no
longer restate the familiar reasons for governmental tort liability
but will come to grips with the difficulties of trying to formulate a
system of sovereign responsibility.

